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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes the important
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The pur-
pose of the Review is to indicate cases of first impression and cases
that significantly affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota
Law.
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ALIMONY AND MAINTENANCE
OPOIEN V. OPOIEN
In Opoien v. Opoien' the issue was whether an award of $400
per month in "alimony" payments constituted a distribution of
property and was thus not subject to modification following a for-
mer spouse's remarriage.' Allan and Ruth Opoien were granted a
divorce in 1985 after 35 years of marriage.3 The parties stipulated
to a partial distribution of property and the divorce court awarded
Ruth "alimony of $400 per month" until she reached age 62 and
$250 per month after age 62.4 Ruth remarried in 1986.' Allan
subsequently moved to modify the divorce judgment by eliminat-
ing the "alimony" payments because of Ruth's remarriage.6 The
district court denied Allan's motion and determined that the
divorce court's award of $400.00 per month "alimony" could not
be modified because it was a distribution of property, that of
Allan's retirement benefits.7
The supreme court stated that the divorce court correctly
analyzed the Ruff-Fischer guidelines which are to be utilized
when determining the equitable distribution of property or
spousal support upon divorce.8 Therefore, the court concluded
that consideration of the parties' earning capacities did not suggest
that the "alimony" award to Ruth Opoien was intended as spousal
support.9 The court also stated that an equitable distribution of
property need not be equal to be equitable; hence reducing Ruth's
"alimony" at age 62 did not transform it into spousal support. 10
The court concluded that the "alimony" was intended as an equi-
table distribution of Allan's retirement benefits; therefore, the trial
court did not err in determining the divorce court's "alimony"
1. 425 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1988).
2. Opoien v. Opoien, 425 N.W.2d 373, 374 (N.D. 1988).
3. Id. Allan Opoien was a school superintendent with a gross annual income of
$36,400. Ruth Opoien was a nurse with an annual income of $7,200. Id. Ruth and Allan
were 53 and 59, respectively, at the time of their divorce. Id.
4. Id. In considering the property distribution, the divorce court noted Ruth's age and
the unlikelihood that her earning capacity would increase or that she would earn
retirement benefits equalling Allan's benefits. Id.
5. Id. Allan stopped making "alimony" payments after Ruth remarried and Ruth
thereafter sued to collect the payments. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The district court reasoned that the "alimony" was intended as "an equitable
distribution of retirement benefits." Id.
8. Id. at 375 (citing Ruff v. Ruff, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952); Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d
845 (N.D. 1966)).
9. Id.
10. Id. Section 14-05-24 North Dakota Century Code provides for an "equitable
distribution" of property in a divorce, and that distribution need not be equal to be
equitable. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981).
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award was not subject to modification.1' Thus, the supreme court
affirmed the district court's denial of modification.
12
WHEELER V. WHEELER
In Wheeler v. Wheeler 13 the issue was whether the district
court erred in modifying a spousal support payment agreement
because of the change in employment earnings of the former
spouse. 4 After 35 years of marriage R.W. Wheeler and Gerridee
Wheeler were granted a divorce in 1984.15 Pursuant to the settle-
ment agreement, R.W. agreed to pay Gerridee $2,430 per month
for support and maintenance until his anticipated retirement ten
years later.16 In addition, the agreement provided that if Gerridee
obtained employment, her monthly alimony payment would be
reduced by an amount equal to one-third of her gross monthly
earnings, but not more than $430.1' The district court approved
the settlement agreement, but specifically retained continuing
jurisdiction to modify the support and maintenance payments.1
8
Gerridee began working at a salary rate of $2,800 per month,
plus she earned $12,400 during 1985 as a legislative lobbyist.19
R.W.'s income remained at $50,000 per year.20 In January 1986
R.W. moved to modify the divorce decree and terminate the sup-
port payments, contending that Gerridee had "achieved economic
rehabilitation and emancipation through employment."21 The dis-
trict court determined that a substantial change in circumstances
had occurred which was not contemplated by the parties at the
time of the settlement agreement and reduced the support pay-
ment to $700 per month.22
The supreme court concluded that the trial court had the
right to modify the agreement.23
11. 425 N.W.2d at 375.
12. Id.
13. 419 N.W.2d 923 (N.D. 1988).
14. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 419 N.W.2d 923, 925 (N.D. 1988).







22. Id. After the modification was granted by the trial court Gerridee's income from
her earnings and the $700 support payment was $3,500. Id. R.W.'s earnings were also
$3,500. Id. Gerridee's earnings as a lobbyist were not taken into account. Id.
23. Id. at 925. The court recognized that when a divorce decree is based on a
settlement agreement the district court should be more reluctant to revise it. Id. The court
noted that upon a substantial change in circumstances, a modification of the spousal support
agreement may be justified. Id. The court determined that since the district court had
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However, the supreme court determined that the trial court
had not analyzed all the pertinent factors in resetting the support
payment.24 The court noted that the district court had not made
any findings about Gerridee's retirement savings.25 Furthermore,
the supreme court recognized that the district court had not con-
sidered changes in R.W.'s standard of living.26 The supreme court
concluded that while a supported spouse should not be penalized
for self-betterment by the reduction of her support payments, her
financial needs and standard of living must be comparatively
weighed with the financial needs and standard of living of the pay-
ing spouse.2 7 Thus, the court remanded the district court's modifi-
cation judgment for reconsideration of the amount of monthly
support payments.28
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
KIPPEN V. FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INS.
In Kippen v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins.2 9 the issue was
whether an insurance company has a duty to provide some notice
of coverage to the named party on the policy."0 Janice Kippen was
injured when she was struck by a vehicle owned by Marcia Burin-
grud.31 Janice's husband, Carlyle, was provided a company car by
his employer for Carlyle's business and personal use.32 Although
the company car was insured, Carlyle had never received any
notice of the terms of the policy.3 3 The Kippens settled with Bur-
ingrud and her insurer and executed a general release.34 Subse-
quently, the Kippens learned that the insurance policy on the car
included underinsured motorist coverage.3 5 The Kippens then
filed a claim for underinsurance benefits.3 6 The insurance com-
pany denied the Kippens' claim because the policy required
reserved continuing jurisdiction in the area of spousal support, the district court had the
power to modify the support agreement in the divorce decree. Id.
24. Id. at 926.
25. Id. The court noted that the amount Gerridee's support payment was reduced by
was the amount she had been putting into savings. Id.
26. Id. at 926-27.
27. Id. at 927. In a concurring opinion, Justice Gierke felt the district court reduced
the support payments to a point where Gerridee's incentive for self-betterment was totally
destroyed. Id. at 928 (Gierke, J., specially concurring).
28. Id.
29. 421 N.W.2d 483 (N.D. 1988).
30. Kippen v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins., 421 N.W.2d 483, 484 (N.D. 1988).
31. Id. at 483.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 484.





prompt notice of claims and consent of the company before settle-
ments with any third party.37 The Kippens sued the insurance
company.38 The trial court determined that the Kippens had com-
plied with the policy's requirement of prompt notice of claims,
because the Kippens had notified the insurance company when
they learned of the contents of the policy. 39 However, the trial
court held that the Kippens' failure to get consent for their settle-
ment with Buringrud barred their claim for underinsurance
benefits.4 °
The supreme court held that an insurance company had a
duty to provide at least a notice of coverage to parties named on
the policy. 41 The court noted that section 26-02-13 of the North
Dakota Century Code requires mutual disclosure of material facts
between parties to an insurance contract.42 The court noted that
requiring an insurer to provide some notice of the contents of an
insurance policy is a logical extension of the public policy inherent
in section 26-02-13 of the North Dakota Century Code.43 There-




In Branson v. Branson 45 the issue was whether the trial court
gave improper weight to a psychologist's recommendation when
taking custody away from the primary caregiver. 46 Pamela Bran-
son had been the primary caregiver for the children of her and her
ex-husband, David, from birth until the court ordered her to give
up custody. 47 Pamela contended on appeal that the court improp-




40. Id. The trial court determined that the insurance company's subrogation rights
against Buringrud were lost. Id.
41. Id. at 485.
42. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-13 (1978) (re codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-
29-17 (Supp. 1987). Section 26-02-13 of the North Dakota Century Code provides,
"Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and
reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is due in
forming the party's estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract or in making the
party's inquiries." Id.
43. 421 N.W.2d at 485; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-02-13 (1978) (re codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-17 (Supp. 1987).
44. 421 N.w.2d at 487.
45. 411 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1987).
46. Branson v. Branson, 411 N.W.2d 395, 399 (N.D. 1987).
47. Id. at 399 n.3.
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guardian ad litem in denying her custody. 8 Dr. Ascano testified
that Pamela might manifest emotional problems later in life
because she had been abused as a child.49 The trial court had
made a finding of fact that both Pamela and David Branson were
fit parents, but it determined that the best interests of the children
would be served if David had custody. 0
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's custody deci-
511
sion. 1 The court stated that the trial court did not rely solely on
the recommendations of Dr. Ascano and the guardian ad litem. 2
The court noted that the issue of custody was a close question in
the instant case. 3 The supreme court held that the trial court's
decision was not clearly erroneous.5 4 Therefore, the supreme
court affirmed the trial court's custody award to David.85
ORKE V. OLSON
In Orke v. Olson 5 6 the issue was whether a father's redemp-
tion from alcoholism was a significant change of circumstances
which would warrant removing a child from the custodial
mother.5 7 Arlene and Terry Olson were granted a divorce in Sep-
tember 1983.8 Custody of their child, Dustin, was placed with
Arlene.5 9 After their divorce, Terry, an alcoholic, recovered from
alcoholism and regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous meet-
ings.60 Further, he married in November 1985 and since the
remarriage had regularly attended church.61  Arlene married
Larry Orke in February 1985.62 Larry had three children from
prior marriages while Arlene had two children from prior mar-
riages in addition to Dustin.63 Because of tension between Larry's
48. Id. at 400. The guardian ad litem also recommended that David have custody. Id.
The guardian ad litem stated that her recommendation was based in part on Dr. Ascano's
recommendation and in part on her own observations of Pamela and David. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 399 n.3.
51. Id. at 400-01.
52. Id. at 400. The other factors apparently taken into account by the trial court in
awarding custody to David included the fact that the children had pets at the farm home,
that the children would not have to change schools, and that the children would be close to
both sets of grandparents. Id. at 399 n.3.
53. Id. at 400.
54. Id. at 401.
55. Id.
56. 411 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1987).
57. Okre v. Olson, 411 N.W.2d 97, 100 (N.D. 1987).
58. Id. at 98.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 99.
61. Id.




oldest child, who had a learning disability, and Arlene's oldest
child who also had a learning disability, Arlene and Larry main-
tained separate households; one home in Bottineau and one home
at the Orke's farm.64 The district court granted a change of cus-
tody of Dustin from Arlene to Terry premising its decision on both
Terry's redemption as a father and Arlene's "unstable" situation.65
The supreme court recognized that although Terry's redemp-
tion may be a significant change of circumstances, "the change of
circumstances must weight against the child's best interests before
a change of custody is justified."6 6 Since Terry's redemption as a
father obviously did not weigh against Dustin's best interests, the
court concluded that the custody change was not warranted.
Further, the court noted that the trial court erred in failing to rec-
ognize that the important factor to consider with regard to stabil-
ity in a child custody case was the stability of the child's
relationship with the custodial parent rather than, as the trial
court considered, the stability in Arlene's relationship with her
husband. 8 Therefore, the supreme court reversed the district
court and granted custody of Dustin to Arlene. 9
CLOSE CORPORATIONS
BALVIK V. SYLVESTER
In Balvik v. Sylvester 70 the issue was whether a majority
shareholder's oppressive conduct toward a minority shareholder
was sufficient to justify involuntary dissolution of the close corpora-
tion.71 The president of the corporation, who was also the major-
ity stockholder, used his position to "freeze out" the minority
stockholder.72 The minority stockholder was removed from his
position as vice president, his employment with the corporation
was terminated, and the majority stockholder refused to buy out
the minority stockholder's shares at a fair price.7 ' The district
64. Id. at 99.
65. Id. at 98.
66. Id. at 100 (citing Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666, 672 (N.D. 1981)). The court
noted that before a change of custody can be deemed necessary for the best interests of the
child, the court must recognize the effect of the change on the child. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court noted that it is the "continual and uninterrupted relationship
[between custodial parent and child] that has been important to the child since the
divorce" rather than Arlene's relationship with Larry. Id.
69. Id.
70. 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987).
71. Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 385 (N.D. 1987).
72. Id. at 387.
73. Id. at 384-85.
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court determined that the majority stockholder's actions were
oppressive and in violation of section 10-21-16(lXb) of the North
Dakota Century Code.7 4 In accordance with this finding the dis-
trict court ordered that the corporation be dissolved because the
only remedy mentioned in section 10-21-16(lXb) of the North
Dakota Century Code was dissolution. 5
Although the supreme court agreed that the majority stock-
holder's actions were oppressive, the court determined that the
statutory remedy of dissolving the corporation was too harsh. 6
The court noted that other states with similar statutes have
allowed alternative equitable remedies not specifically stated in
their statutes.77 The court suggested that the majority stockholder
could pay the minority stockholder the true value of his stock as an
alternative equitable remedy.78  Thus, the supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determin-





In Baier v. Hampton"0 the issue was whether the order find-
ing Hampton in contempt of court for failure to pay child support
and for deceitful and evasive testimony was criminal in part, and if
so, whether there was compliance with the procedural require-
ments of N.D. R. Crim. P. 43.81 In February of 1985, Hampton
was ordered to pay $115 a month per child for the support of two
74. Id. at 385; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-21-16(lXb) (1983Xoppressive acts by those in
control of a corporation are grounds for an involuntary dissolution). Section 10-21-16 was
repealed and replaced with section 10-19.1-115 of the North Dakota Century Code by the
1985 legislative assembly. 411 N.W.2d at 385 n.2.
75. 411 N.W.2d at 388; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-21-16 (1983) (replaced by § 10-19.1-
115 (1985Xoppressive acts are grounds for an involuntary dissolution).
76. 411 N.W.2d at 389.
77. Id. at 389. See Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980); Sauer v.
Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).
78. 411 N.W.2d at 389. The court stated that either Sylvester or the corporation could
purchase Balvik's stock. Id. The court distinguished Evanenko v. Farmers Union Elevator
in which it had stated that a "corporation cannot be compelled to purchase its own shares of
stock held by a deceased member." Id. at 389 n.4 (quoting Evanenko v. Farmers Union
Elevator, 191 N.w.2d 258, 262 (N.D. 1971)). Corporations are not limited from purchases of
stock but are for the purpose of paying dissenting shareholders who are entitled to
payment. Id.; see § 10-19-05(cXreplaced by § 10-19.1-93 (1985)Xpower of corporation to
acquire its share).
79. 411 N.W.2d at 389.
80. 417 N.W.2d 801 (N.D. 1987).
81. Baier v. Hampton, 417 N.W.2d 801, 803 (N.D. 1987).
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children pursuant to a Ward County divorce decree.8 2 In August
of 1986, the first of several hearings was held to determine Hamp-
ton's ability to pay.83 Hampton testified that his only income was
monthly retirement benefits in the amount of $466.00.84 In March
of 1987, the court learned that Hampton also had been receiving
monthly military educational benefits of $606.00.85 The court
found Hampton in contempt and inter alia sentenced him to 60
days in jail. 86 Hampton contended that the unconditional jail sen-
tence was unauthorized by N.D.C.C. § 27-10-04.87
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court found
Hampton in civil contempt for failure to pay child support and in
criminal contempt for his testimony about his income.88 Hampton
did not assert that he was denied notice or an opportunity to be
heard for the civil contempt, thus, the court affirmed that portion
of the order.8 9 As to the criminal contempt based upon deceitful
and evasive testimony, procedural protections of N.D. R. Crim. P.
42(b) were not followed.90 Accordingly, the court reversed the
unconditional thirty day sentence imposed against Hampton for
criminal contempt.9
CONTRACTS
HERMAN V. NEWMAN SIGNS, INC.
In Herman v. Newman Signs, Inc. the issue revolved around
the geographic enforceability of a covenant not to compete. 92 The
covenant stated that plaintiff could not compete with defendant,
within the state of North Dakota, in a bulk sale contract.93 The
court held that covenants not to compete are narrow in scope in
North Dakota pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 9-08-06 to a "specified
county, city or a part of either. 94 In addition, a covenant not to





86. Id. at 804. The court allowed Hampton to purge himself of 30 days of the sentence
by making post due payments. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 805.
89. Id. at 806.
90. Id. During oral argument, it was conceded that the contempt hearing was not
conducted pursuant to N.D. R. Crim. P. 42(b). Id.
91. Id.
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lar cannot be implied to mean restriction in a plurality pursuant to
N.D.C.C. § 1-01-35. 95
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STATE V. VALGREN
In State v. Valgren 9 6 the defendant raised two issues of impor-
tance.97 The first was whether an indigent defendant has the right
to take depositions of witnesses at the State's expense.98 The sec-
ond was whether the defendant's motion during trial to suppress
an audiovisual tape was timely.99 Gordon Valgren was arrested for
driving while under the influence of alcohol.100 The district court
determined he was indigent and appointed counsel. 1 1 Thereaf-
ter, Valgren moved to take discovery depositions of all witnesses at
the state's expense.' 2 The district court denied the deposition
requests, but granted a hearing to determine probable cause at
which Valgren could cross-examine all witnesses.' 0 3 However,
Valgren did not avail himself of the probable cause hearing.'0 4
The United States Supreme Court has held that a psychiatric
assistant must be provided at state expense to an indigent defend-
ant using an insanity defense.' 05 However, the Court has also held
that an indigent defendant is not denied due process where he has
access to an adequate alternative to the defense materials
requested. 10 6 The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
Valgren had an adequate alternative to taking discovery deposi-
tions at the state's expense, and therefore, he was not denied
access to the "raw materials integral to an . effective
defense."' 0 7 The court indicated that Valgren's adequate alterna-
tive to depositions was to take statements at the probable cause
95. Id. at 181.
96. 411 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1987).




101. Id. at 391.
102. Id. Valgren wanted the deposition of the arresting officer, Mike Lynk, and all
other eye witnesses. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 392; see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985) ("fundamental fairness
entitles indigent defendants to 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly
within the adversary system' ") (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
106. 411 N.W.2d at 392; see Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 230 (1971) (indigent
defendant had requested a free transcript, but defendant could have had the court reporter
read back his notes instead).




The second issue pertained to the timeliness of a suppression
motion. 109 The evidence which Valgren wanted suppressed was
an audiovisual tape, but he did not make the motion until trial." °
The supreme court addressed the issue of whether the failure to
make the motion prior to trial operated as a waiver pursuant to
section 12(bX3) and (f) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure."' The court was persuaded by federal courts' interpreta-
tions that a motion to suppress must be made before trial or it will
be considered waived."i 2  The supreme court concluded that
because Valgren did not make his motion to suppress until trial
and no cause for relief was shown, the motion was waived." 3
Thus, the supreme court affirmed the district court's conviction of
Valgren. 114
STATE V. THIEL
In State v. Thiel 1 5 the court considered what evidence is
needed before a trial court should give jury instructions on self-
defense or defense of others. 1 16 Mark Thiel was involved in a
motel room brawl in which Duane Senger's nose was broken."'
Witnesses for the defense testified that Thiel had attempted to res-
cue Jeff Moltzen from the fight.1 8 Additional testimony indicated
that several people, most of who were strangers, were pushing and
shoving Thiel and Moltzen." 9 The trial court refused to instruct
the jury on self-defense and defense of others because the defend-
ant's witnesses failed to provide evidence that Senger hit or
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 392. The audiovisual tape was made subsequent to Valgren's arrest and
while he was administered two breathalyzer tests. Id. at 390-91.
111. Id. at 393; see N.D.R. CRIM. P. § 12(bX3) and (f) (1975). Section 12(bX3) of the
North Dakota Century Code states that motions to suppress evidence on the ground that it
was illegally obtained must be made prior to trial. N.D. R. CRiM. P. § 12(bX3) (1975).
Section 12(f) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Failure by the defendant to raise defenses or objections or to make requests
which must be made prior to trial, at the time set by the court pursuant to
subdivision (c), or prior to any extension thereof made by the court, shall
constitute a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
the waiver.
112. 411 N.W.2d at 393 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 advisory committee's note).
113. 411 N.W.2d at 394.
114. Id. at 395.
115. 411 N.W.2d 66 (N.D. 1987).
116. State v. Thiel, 411 N.W.2d 66, 67 (N.D. 1987).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 68.
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assaulted Thiel or Moltzen. 120
The supreme court recognized that a defendant is entitled to
an instruction based on a legal defense if there is evidence to sup-
port it.12 ' Although defense witnesses were unable to identify
Senger and his role in the incident, the court determined that
under the circumstances it was reasonable to infer that Senger was
one of the people either fighting with Moltzen or pushing Thiel.
122
The supreme court concluded that the record contained sufficient
evidence to raise the issues of self-defense and defense of others





In Dosland v. Netland'24 the issue was whether the interpre-
tation of a liquidated damages clause constituted a material fact so
as to render the district court's granting of a summary judgment
erroneous. On November 17, 1985, J.P. Dosland and Arlis
McCauly (hereafter Dosland) entered into a written agreement
with Michael and Susan Netland (Netlands) which stated that Dos-
land would sell to the Netlands a home in Fargo, North Dakota, for
the price of $130,000 with an earnest money agreement of
$2,000.125 The Netlands did not purchase the home and subse-
quently the property was sold for $114,000.126 Dosland thereafter
sued Netlands to recover damages in the amount of $16,000 plus
interest thereon from December 30, 1985 and costs and disburse-
ments. 127 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Netlands holding that Dosland was only entitled to the ear-
nest money as damages as provided under the agreement. 128 Dos-
120. Id. Most of the defense witnesses were unable to identify Senger's role in the
brawl. Id. The people involved were not acquainted with each other. Id.
121. Id. at 67 (citing State v. Biby, 366 N.W.2d 460, 465 (N.D. 1985); State v. Schimetz,
328 N.W.2d 808, 812 (N.D. 1982); State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 753 (N.D. 1976)).
122. 411 N.W.2d at 68.
123. Id. at 69.
124. Dosland v. Netland, 424 N.W.2d 141 (N.D. 1988).
125. Id. The Netlands were required to complete the purchase of the property by
closing the sale on or before December 30, 1985. Id.
126. ld.
127. Id. The $16,000 represents the contract price of $130,000 less the amount the
home was eventually sold for, $114,000.
128. Id. The earnest money clause in paragraph 2 of the agreement provided in part:
"If said sale is approved by the owner and the owner's said title is insurable or marketable
and the purchaser for any reason fails, neglects or refuses to complete purchase and to
make payments promptly as above set forth, then the owner shall be paid the earnest
money so held in escrow as liquidated damages for such failure to consumate [sic] the
562 [Vol. 65:551
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land appealed the district court's ruling arguing that the earnest
clause was ambiguous and secondly that liquidated damages clause
was void.12 9 Therefore, Dosland contended since a genuine issue
of material fact existed, the granting of summary judgment by the
district court was erroneous.
The supreme court recognized that pursuant to North Dakota
Century Code Section 9-08-04, liquidated damages clauses were
enforceable in situations where the damages sustained by a breach
would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual dam-
age.' 30 The court stated when interpreting a liquidated damages
clause for enforceability, the trial court must make findings of fact
as to the "foundational facts" of the clause. 13 1 The court cited
North Dakota precedent that held that foundational facts required
a finding that "(1) the damages stemming from a breach of con-
tract are impractical or extremely difficult to ascertain at the time
the contract was entered into; (2) there was a reasonable endeavor
by the parties to fix their compensation; and (3) the amount stipu-
lated bears a reasonable relation to the probable damages and is
not disproportionate to any damages reasonably to be antici-
pated.' 32 Therefore, the supreme court concluded that since the
district court failed to make findings as to these foundational facts,
the granting of summary judgment against Dosland was in error
and thus, the case must be remanded for further findings of fact. 1
33
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR
DAKOTA BANK & TRUST CO. v. GRINDE
In Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Grinde'" the issue was
whether a guarantor of a promissory note could be considered a
"debtor" for purposes of Article 9 of North Dakota's Uniform
Commercial Code, thereby precluding the guarantor from waiv-
ing notice of his rights with respect to disposition of the collat-
eral."' Jon Grinde personally guaranteed a $95,000 promissory
note executed by his solely owned corporation, C.J.'s Inc. (C.J.'s), to
Dakota Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo (Dakota Bank).'13  The money
purchase, without prejudice or other rights and legal remedies." Id. at 142 (emphasis
added).
129. Id. at 141.
130. Id. at 142.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 142 (citing 312 N.W.2d 326, 330 (N.D. 1981)).
133. Id. at 143.
134. 422 N.W.2d 813 (N.D. 1988).
135. Dakota Bank & Trust Co. v. Grinde, 422 N.W.2d 813, 816 (N.D. 1988).
136. Id. at 814.
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was used to purchase equipment and fixtures for a bar and restau-
rant C.J.'s was purchasing near Detroit Lakes. 3 ' C.J.'s leased the
bar and restaurant to Randy Johnson pursuant to a verbal agree-
ment requiring Johnson to make C.J.'s loan payments to Dakota
Bank.' 8 Although the parties disagreed as to whether there was a
default, Dakota Bank took possession of the bar and restaurant and
sold it to Johnson at a price which was "far below market value"
according to Grinde.139 Dakota Bank moved for summary judg-
ment against Grinde as guarantor of the promissory note contend-
ing that under the terms of the guaranty, Grinde had waived all
his rights with respect to the disposition of the collateral. 140 On
appeal of the district court's granting of summary judgment,
Grinde contended that even if he had waived his rights with
regard to the disposition of the collateral under the terms of the
guaranty contract, he was nonetheless a "debtor" for purposes of
Article 9.141 Therefore, Grinde argued that he was precluded
from validly waiving his rights with regard to 1) receiving notice of
disposition of collateral, 2) regarding the bank to sell the collateral
in a commercially reasonable manner, or 3) requiring the bank to
act in good faith.
142
Despite the fact that a North Dakota federal district court had
interpreted North Dakota law to be that a guarantor could waive
notice of intended disposition of collateral in the guaranty agree-
ment, the supreme court concluded that the guarantor could not
waive those rights. 143 The supreme court determined that a guar-
antor was a "debtor" for purposes of Article 9 and therefore was
precluded from waiving the protections afforded under section 41-
09-50(3) of the North Dakota Century Code. 144 The court noted
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 815. Grinde testified that he was led to believe that Dakota Bank would be
looking after Grinde's interests in their dealings with Johnson, the prospective purchaser.
Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 816.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 816-17 (citing United States v. Kukowski, 735 F.2d 1057, 1058-59 (8th Cir.
1984); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-47(3) (1983). Section 41-09-47(3) of the North Dakota
Century Code provides:
To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the
secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred to below may not be
waived or varied except as provided with respect to compulsory disposition of
collateral (subsection 3 of section 41-09-50) and with respect to redemption of
collateral (section 41-09-52) ....
Id.
144. 422 N.W.2d at 817; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-50(3) (1983 & Supp. 1987). The
court distinguished Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller in which the court held that
guarantors were not protected by the anti-deficiency statutes because they were not
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that upon default the guarantor becomes primarily liable on the
debt and consequently has a strong interest in protecting his rights
regarding the sale or disposition of the collateral.' 45 Further, the
court stated that requiring a secured party to give notice of dispo-
sition of collateral to the guarantor would not prejudice the credi-




In In re Kraemer,148 the issue was whether the supreme court
has the authority to investigate and resolve complaints involving a
disbarred attorney's pre-disbarment conduct.149  Frederick D.
Kraemer was initially disbarred as the result of a North Dakota
state court conviction for theft of property and federal convictions
for interstate transportation of stolen goods, mail fraud, and con-
spiracy.1 50  Concurrent with his initial disbarment there were
unrelated complaints of misconduct pending against him in North
Dakota. 151
In addition, the court, by statute, has the authority to promul-
gate rules and regulations governing an attorney's admission to
practice, discipline, and disbarment.
152
The court also noted that the rules of disciplinary procedures
do not prohibit the court from investigating an attorney's conduct
at any time. 153 Furthermore, the court noted that it had the
authority to investigate post-disbarment conduct for purposes of
reinstatement. 154 Thus, the court held that it had both the author-
personally liable on the initial debt. 422 N.W.2d at 817 (citing Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v.
Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640, 642-43 (1980)); see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (anti-
deficiency judgment statute). The supreme court determined that the statutory definition
of debtor under North Dakota's UCC statutes is broader than the language used in the anti-
deficiency judgment statutes. 422 N.W.2d at 817. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-
05(1XdX1983 & Supp. 1987XU.C.C. statute) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (anti-
deficiency judgment statute).
145. 422 N.W.2d at 817.
146. Id. The court noted that since a guaranty agreement is executed at the request of
the secured party, the secured party would not suffer prejudice because the identity and
location of the guarantor are known to the secured party. Id.
147. Id. at 819.
148. 411 N.W.2d 71 (N.D. 1987).
149. In re Kraemer, 411 N.W.2d 71, 73 (N.D. 1987).
150. Id. at 72.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 73; see N.D. CONST. art. 6, § 3 (the supreme court shall have authority to
promulgate rules for attorneys at law).
153. 411 N.W.2d at 73; see N.D.R. Dis. P. 8 (complaint procedure).
154. 411 N.W.2d at 73.
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The issue in State v. Nygaard156 was whether the district
court erred by allowing into evidence a blood sample in which the
chain of custody was not maintained according to the rules pro-
scribed by the state toxicologist.' 57 Daryl Nygaard was arrested
for driving under the influence of alcohol and a blood sample was
taken. 118 The officer failed to properly follow the state toxicolo-
gist's instructions for blood sample collection and submission.1
5 9
The officer did not correctly seal and label the sample before it was
sent to the state toxicologist.' 60 The district court, however,
allowed the sample to be admitted into evidence and Nygaard was
convicted. 161
The supreme court determined that when there is a deviation
from the established rules for blood sample collection, the State
must establish that there were sufficient indicia of reliability in the
collection and submission of the blood sample. 1 2 The court stated
that it assumed the state toxicologist had reasons for establishing
collection directions. 163 The court noted that the state failed to
establish that the blood sample tested was the same blood col-
lected from Nygaard.164 Therefore, the supreme court deter-
mined that the trial court erred in admitting the blood sample
test. 165 The court determined that the error was prejudicial
against Nygaard and remanded the case for a new trial.'
66
155. Id.
156. 426 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1988).
157. State v. Nygaard, 426 N.W.2d 547, 548 (N.D. 1988).
158. Id. at 547.
159. Id. at 549. The state toxicologist has directions which police officers use for blood
sample collection. Id. The directions are spelled out on form 104 which the officers
complete when submitting a blood sample. Id.
160. Id. Instructions on form 104 state: "seal the vial with one layer of tape and label
the vial with the name of the subject and the arresting officer." Id.
161. Id. at 548.
162. Id. at 549. The state must demonstrate reliability which is sufficient to allow the
blood sample to be admitted into evidence. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 849-50.





In State v. Thomas,1 67 the issue was whether the district court
erred in convicting the defendant for being in control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or with a
breath alcohol content of 0.10% by weight or greater in violation
of section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. 168 James
Thomas was observed by a police officer sitting in the front seat of
his car at 2:40 a.m. on January 4, 1987.1"9 The officer noticed a
strong odor of alcohol on Thomas' breath and observed that his
eyes were extremely blood shot. 7 0 Thomas failed to perform sev-
eral physical tests for the officer.' 7 ' An intoxilyzer test was given
and the results showed that Thomas had a blood alcohol concen-
tration of 0.11%.172 Thomas tried to suppress all of the physical
and chemical tests. 173 However, the trial court ordered that the
tests not be suppressed.'
74
The Supreme Court ruled that the field sobriety tests were not
the fruits of an illegally obtained statement and therefore were
admissible.' 7 5 The court noted that the intoxilyzer test results
were admissible since the arrest was not based on illegally
obtained evidence.' 76 The court concluded that the field sobriety
tests were fairly administered and were properly admitted by the
trial court.' 77 Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's conviction.'
78
WIBBEN V. NORTH DAKOTA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER
In Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner '
79
the issue was whether the arresting officer had a reasonable suspi-
cion to make an investigatory stop.' On October 12, 1986, at
2:35 a.m., the Jamestown police dispatch relayed an anonymous
167. 420 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1988).




172. Id. at 750.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. However, the trial court ordered that all oral statements made by Thomas in
response to custodial interrogatories be suppressed. Id.
176. Id. at 751.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 413 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1987).
180. Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner, 413 N.W.2d 329, 330
(N.D. 1987).
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call to Officer Gerald Klosterman.' The unidentified person
reported that a girl seated in an automobile in an apartment park-
ing lot appeared to be sick or intoxicated. 82 At the parking lot
Officer Klosterman found a girl sitting in the car which fit the
description of the anonymous informant. 83  The officer
approached the car to determine Wibben's condition." 4 When
Wibben rolled down the window the officer noticed that Wibben's
speech was slurred and her eyes were red and bloodshot. 185 At
that point the officer had Wibben perform sobriety tests which she
failed, and the officer arrested Wibben for actual physical control
of a vehicle while intoxicated. 8 6 At an administrative hearing the
examiner suspended Wibben's driver's license privileges and the
district court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision.' 87
The supreme court first recognized that Officer Klosterman's
actions, regardless of motive, amounted to an investigatory stop
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.' 88 The court declined to decide whether the
anonymous tip had enough indicia of reliability to justify an inves-
tigatory stop.' 89 The court noted that because Officer Klosterman
personally verified most of the details of the anonymous tip he had
sufficient information for a reasonable suspicion of unlawful con-
duct. 190 The court reasoned that the State's interest in verifying
the officer's reasonable suspicion outweighed Wibben's minimal
privacy interest, and the investigatory stop was justified.' 91 Thus,
the supreme court affirmed the suspension of Wibben's driving
privileges. 192





186. Id. Officer Klosterman noted that the keys were in the ignition. Id.
187. Id. at 330-31. Wibben's license was suspended pursuant to section 39-08-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 330; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (1987Xpersons
under the influence of intoxicating liquor not to operate vehicle).
188. Id. at 331; U.S. Const. amend. IV (right of people to be secure from unreasonable
searches). Justice Vandewalle wrote separately stating that he did not recognize Officer
Klosterman's stop as a stop which implicates the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution. Id. at 336 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in result); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(right of people to be secure from unreasonable searches).
189. Id. at 332. Justice Levine wrote separately stating that the tip in this case would
be unreliable by itself. Id. at 333 (Levine, J., specially concurring).
190. Id. at 332.
191. Id. at 332-33.





In State v. Anderson the issues were: 1) whether the state con-
stitution authorized the legislature to regulate nonpublic as well as
public schools; 2) whether the requirement of advanced govern-
ment approval for religious schools and that religious schools
employ only teachers certified by the state violates the establish-
ment clause of the First Amendment; and 3) whether requiring
religious schools to only employ state certified teachers violates
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. 9 3 Deborah and
Lawrence Anderson did not send their three school-aged children
to Jamestown Public Schools during the 1986-87 school year
despite living in the Jamestown District.'94 The Andersons
believe that God had given them the responsibility for their chil-
dren's religious conviction which required them to teach their
children at home.'9 5 The Andersons taught their children at their
home school which was not an approved private or parochial
school under N.D.C.C. § 15-34.1-03(1).196 The Andersons were
charged with violating the compulsory school attendance law, and
after a bench trial they were found guilty, which they appealed.
1 97
The Supreme Court in analyzing N.D. Const. Art. VIII read
sections 1 and 2, which authorize the legislature to establish "pub-
lic schools," in light of sections 3 and 4, which authorize the legisla-
ture to take the necessary steps to ensure uniform instruction and
impress upon the minds the importance of "truthfulness, temper-
ance, purity, public spirit, and respect for honest labor of every
kind."' 9 When these sections are harmonized, the legislature's
plenary power is not limited to regulating only "public schools."' 99
The Supreme Court next' reviewed the issue of requiring
parochial teachers to be state certified.2 0 0 The Supreme Court
evaluated the state's motive behind this requirement and con-
cluded that teacher certification is a sound means of regulating the
adequacy of education and does not indicate a primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion.2 0 ' The court noted that these
193. 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1988).




198. Id. at 318.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 320.
201. Id. at 322.
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requirements do not indicate an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion and therefore there is no violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause.2 °2
In review of the Anderson's claim that requiring religious
schools to employ only state certified teachers, the court simply
rejected Anderson's contentions that there are less restrictive
alternatives.20 3 The court was not persuaded that this compelling
state interest could be achieved by a less restrictive means.20 4
Therefore, the judgments of the convictions were affirmed.20 5
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
ELDRIDGE V. EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD SAMARITAN
SOCIETY
In Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soci-
ety 20 6 the issue was whether the defendant's personnel policy
handbook was part of the employment contract.20 7 Rosemary
Eldridge began working for the Evangelical Lutheran Good
Samaritan Society (Society) as a part-time charge nurse in May
1978.208 In August 1978 Eldridge was assigned additional duties as
an in-service director and thus became a full-time employee.20 9 In
August 1982 Eldridge was relieved of her in-service duties and
was cut back to part-time employment. 210 Eldridge subsequently
commenced an action against the Society in January 1985, claim-
ing breach of an employment contract.211 The personnel policy
handbook, Eldridge argued, was a part of her employment con-
tract which was breached when her workload was reduced to part-
time status.21 2 Eldridge further contended that the contract was
breached because of the Society's failure to follow the progressive
discipline procedures specified in its personnel policy hand-
202. Id. at 322-24.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 325.
206. 417 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1987).
207. Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 417 N.W.2d 797, 798
(N.D. 1987).
208. Id. at 797.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 798. Eldridge's supervisor relieved Eldridge of her in-service duties to
allow her to get caught up with her nursing work. Id. at 797.
211. Id. at 798.
212. Id. Eldridge argued that the presumption of at-will employment had been
rebutted because the personnel policy handbook was part of an employment contract. Id.
Eldridge also argued that her reduction in workload was essentially a termination of her
employment. Id. n.1. Consequently, Eldridge claimed that her employment contract was
breached. Id. at 798.
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book.21 3 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, holding that the personnel handbook was not part
of her employment contract.2 14
The supreme court agreed with the trial court that the Soci-
ety's "Personnel Policy Handbook was not part of the employment
contract and therefore Eldridge's employment was at will and
could be terminated at any time and for any reason. '21 5 The court
noted that in North Dakota employment is presumed to be at will
if an employee is hired for an unspecified period of time.2 16 -How-
ever, the court noted that it has recognized that express or implied
promises regarding job security and termination procedures in
employee handbooks may create an exception to the presumption
of at-will employment.2 17 In addition, the court acknowledged
that an employer may specifically state in a company handbook
that the handbook is not part of the employment relationship, but
that it is merely a statement of company policy.218 The personnel
policy handbook of the Society contained a disclaimer which
stated that the handbook was not to be construed as an employ-
ment contract.219 The supreme court concluded thus that the dis-
claimer operated to preserve the presumption of at-will
employment, and consequently, Eldridge was considered an at-
will employee.220 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the sum-
mary judgment of the district court.221
EVIDENCE
COLLOM V. PIERSON
In Collom v. Pierson2 22 the issue was whether the testimony
from a medical expert who was not from the same field of
medicine as the defendant should have been allowed into evi-
dence. 2 3 On November 7, 1972 Sheri Collom was examined in
the emergency room of Trinity Medical Center in Minot after
213. Id. The policy handbook set out steps for progressive discipline of employees. Id.
at 798 n.2.
214. Id. at 798.
215. Id. at 799.
216. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (1987) (termination of at-will employees).
217. Id. at 799 (citing Bailey v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 120, 123 (N.D.
1986)).
218. 417 N.W.2d at 799-800 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081,
1088 (1984).
219. Id. at 800 n.3.
220. Id. at 800.
221. Id. at 801.
222. 411 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1987).
223. Collom v. Pierson, 411 N.W.2d 92, 94-95 (N.D. 1987).
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complaining of pain in her pelvic area. 2 4 Dr. R.W. Pierson discov-
ered a pelvic mass and consulted Dr. Dennis J. Lutz, a specialist in
obstetrics and gynecology. 225 Dr. Lutz recommended exploratory
surgery which was conducted on November 9, 1982.2 During
surgery Dr. Lutz removed Collom's right fallopian tube after find-
ing a cyst and an infected mass.227 Before Collom's release from
the hospital on November 20, she experienced fever, severe
abdominal pain, and other symptoms. 228 Collom returned to the
Trinity Medical Center on November 25 complaining of pain and
shortness of breath.229 She was promptly transported to a Minne-
apolis hospital where an opening in her lower colon was discov-
ered.23 ° On November 26, 1982 Dr. Leonard Schultz operated
and found a one centimeter long hole in the colon and an exten-
sive infection in Collom's abdomen.2 3'
Collom brought suit against Dr. Lutz, Dr. Pierson, and Trinity
Medical Center alleging malpractice.232 Collom claimed Dr. Lutz
carelessly caused the opening in her colon during surgery or that
he failed to properly diagnose and treat the condition which
caused the hole.233 Dr. Lutz's defense was that the opening
occurred after surgery and that his treatment was proper.234 Dr.
Lutz's sole medical expert was Dr. M. Michael Eisenberg who had
expertise in gastroenterology, a specialty in digestive system disor-
ders.23 5 Dr. Eisenberg testified that the opening in Collom's colon
was, at the most, three days old on November 26 and could not
have been caused during Dr. Lutz's surgery which occurred sev-
enteen days earlier.236
During the deposition of Dr. Eisenberg, Collom's counsel
objected to the concluding question by Dr. Lutz's counsel:
237
"Q [By MR. ZUGER] The bottom line is, do you find







231. Id. From December 1982 to May 1985 Collom was hospitalized fifteen times
undergoing examination, testing, and three subsequent surgeries. Id.
232. Id. Trinity Medical Center was dropped from the suit before trial. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 93-94. Dr. Eisenberg was a surgeon from New York. Id. at 93.
236. ld. at 94. Dr. Eisenberg testified that the opening may have been caused by tubes




any evidence of malpractice or negligence.., on the part
of either Dr. Lutz or Dr. Pierson in this case?
"A: No.
"MR. SAEFKE: We're going to object on the basis of
no foundation.
"MR. ZUGER: And so that I have an opportunity to
cure this before I conclude this deposition, where is he
lacking in foundational qualifications?
"MR. SAEFKE: That's not my obligation, counsel.
"MR. ZUGER: If he's not going to be specific, I can't
cure it, so I guess, Dr. Eisenberg, go ahead. You can
answer the question....
"A I don't find any evidence of negligence or
malpractice. "238
Collom sought at trial to exclude all of Dr. Eisenberg's testi-
mony, claiming, in part, that the doctor's lack of familiarity with
obstetrics and gynecology disqualified him as an expert witness.239
The trial court allowed Dr. Eisenberg's video-taped deposition
into evidence and the jury found that the doctors were not
negligent.2 4 °
The supreme court refused to accept Collom's contention that
because Dr. Eisenberg was not of the same "school of medicine" as
the defendant, Dr. Eisenberg's testimony must be excluded.24 1
The court reasoned that an expert's "knowledge, experience, and
special training," not the school they follow, qualifies them to
testify.
242
Regarding the foundational objections during Dr. Eisenberg's
deposition, the supreme court noted that frequently additional tes-
timony can cure the lack of foundation.2 43 Therefore, the court
stated that a foundational objection at a deposition must be suffi-
238. Id.
239. Id. Collom also claimed Dr. Eisenberg was not familiar with the localities and
circumstances to qualify him to testify as to medical practices in North Dakota. Id.
240. Id. Collom sought a new trial against Dr. Lutz based on Dr. Eisenberg's lack of
qualification to testify. Id. at 94-95.
241. Id. at 96.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 95.
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ciently specific to allow the opposing party to cure it. 2 44 The court
concluded that since Collom's counsel failed to sufficiently specify
his objection at the deposition, it could not be considered at trial or
on appeal.245 Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court and allowed the evidentiary use of the testimony.246
GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY AND LIABILITY
FASTOW v. BURLEIGH COUNTY WATER RESOURCE DISTRICT
In Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Resource District2 47 the
issues are whether North Dakota's Recreational Use Statute limits
the liability of political subdivisions and whether or not a political
subdivision waives its governmental immunity to the extent of
purchased insurance.2 41 McDowell Dam is a man-made recrea-
tion area situated in Burleigh County.249 The dam is owned by the
Burleigh County Water District (Water District) and operated by
the Bismarck Park District (Park District).250 While swimming at
McDowell Dam, Fastow dove into the water within the designated
swimming area and injured his spinal cord, rendering him a
quadriplegic. 25 ' Fastow sued both the Water District and the Park
District alleging various grounds. 2  The trial court determined
that North Dakota's Recreational Use Statute2 53 limited the liabil-
ity of political subdivisions. 2 4 Therefore, the court held that Fas-
tow had no cause of action against the Water District and that
Fastow had a cause of action against the Park District only under
the theory of employee negligence.25
The supreme court determined that North Dakota's Recrea-
tional Use Statute, which limits liability of landowners, was appli-
cable to political subdivisions.256 The court construed section 32-
12.1-03(1) as making the limited liability provisions of chapter 53-
244. Id. See United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1314 (8th Cir. 1984).
245. Collom, 411 N.W.2d at 95.
246. Id. at 96.
247. 415 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1987).
248. Fastow v. Burleigh County Water Resource Dist., 415 N.W.2d 505, 507 (N.D.
1987).
249. Id. at 506.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 507.
252. Id. Fastow alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate first aid
equipment, failed to provide telephone communications with medical facilities, failed to
provide proper warnings, and failed to provide adequately trained employees, among other
allegations. Id.
253. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 53-08 (1981Xlimited liability for owner of recreational land).
254. 415 N.W.2d at 507.
255. Id.




08 of the North Dakota Century Code applicable to political subdi-
visions.25 7 Therefore, a political subdivision would be liable for
damages only when a private landowner would be under chapter
53-08 of the North Dakota Century Code.258  The court futher
noted, however, that section 32-12.1-05 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code provides that a political subdivision waives its govern-
mental immunity when it purchases liability insurance.25 9
Therefore, the supreme court reversed the summary judgment
against the Water District and reversed the partial summary judg-
ment against the Park District.26 °
HOSPITALS
NELSON V. TRINITY MEDICAL CENTER
In Nelson v. Trinity Medical Center261 the defendant hospital
appealed from the trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction on
the "captain of the ship" doctrine.262 Kristen Nelson was born
severely brain damaged.263 The brain damage was caused by a
placental abruption which could have been diagnosed by a fetal
heart-rate monitor.264 The attending physicians had left standing
orders that all of their patients were to be placed on a fetal heart-
rate monitor upon admission to the hospital. 265 The attending
nurse, Susan Orr, testified that she did not place Kristen's mother,
Diane, on a fetal heart-rate monitor for over an hour after Diane
arrived at the hospital.266 Diane was complaining of severe
abdominal pain upon entering the hospital.267 One of the attend-
ing physicians checked Diane twice during the hour before the
257. 415 N.w.2d at 508; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 3 2 -12 .1-0 3 (1XSupp. 1987). Section 32-
12.1-03(1) of the North Dakota Century Code states:
Each political subdivision shall be liable for money damages for injuries
when the injuries are proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or
omission of any employee acting within the scope of the employee's
employment or office under circumstances where the employee would be
personally liable to a claimant in accordance with the laws of this state, or injury
caused from some condition or use of tangible property, real or personal, under
circumstances where the political subdivision, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant.
258. 415 N.W.2d at 508.
259. Id. at 509; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-05 (Supp. 1987Xliability insurance
policy coverage).
260. 415 N.W.2d at 510.
261. 419 N.W.2d 886 (N.D. 1988).
262. Nelson v. Trinity Medical Center, 419 N.W.2d 886, 892 (N.D. 1988).
263. Id. at 888.
264. Id.
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fetal monitor was placed on Diane. 2 6' The Nelsons initially
brought an action against the hospital and the attending physi-
cians.2 69 However, the physicians reached an out of court settle-
ment with the Nelsons prior to trial.2 10  The jury thereafter
awarded the Nelsons approximately seven million dollars against
Trinity Medical Center.271 The verdict was reduced to five and
one-half million dollars on remittitur 2
The supreme court determined that the "captain of the ship"
doctrine was inapplicable to the instant case and therefore held
that the trial court was correct in denying an instruction on the
doctrine.273 The hospital's basis for requesting the instruction was
the fact that one attending physician had briefly examined Diane
twice before the monitor was placed on her.274 In addition, the
physician had told Nurse Orr to check the fetal heart tones.27
The supreme court stated that in most circumstances a nurse acts
independently of a doctor even when the nurse is under a doctor's
orders. 6 The court determined that the "captain of the ship"
doctrine does not apply when a nurse is performing routine medi-
cal tasks pursuant to a doctor's orders.277 The court noted that
Nurse Orr's conduct consisted of routine medical tasks.278 There-
fore, the supreme court held that the trial court had not erred in
refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine. 9
JOINT TENANCY
OLSON V. FRAASE
In Olson v. Fraase28 0 one issue was whether a security agree-
ment entered into by a joint tenant who offers as security his undi-
vided interest in the joint tenancy becomes ineffective if that joint
268. Id. at 890.
269. Id. at 888.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. The trial court stated that it would grant the defendants a new trial unless the
Nelsons agreed to a remittitus of damages from seven million dollars to five and one-half
million dollars. Id.
273. Id. at 892. The "'captain of the ship" doctrine provides that a physician will be
held liable for the negligence of a nurse where the physician had sufficient control over the
work to be done and the manner of doing it. Id. at 890.
274. Id. at 890.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 891. The court noted that a nurse continues to be subject to the regulations
of the hospital even when being instructed by a doctor. Id. (quoting Foster v. Englewood
Hosp. Ass'n, 313 N.E.2d 255, 260 (1974)).
277. Id. at 890.
278. Id.
279. Id
280. 421 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1988).
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tenant dies prior to default.28" ' Mavis Olson sued the Fraase broth-
ers (defendants) for legal malpractice.282 She alleged that the
defendants gave inaccurate advice when they advised her to pay
off a note obtained by her deceased husband, Robert.28 3 Robert
had obtained a note and gave as security his interest in a car which
he owned as a joint tenant with Mavis.284 Mavis had not signed
the note or security agreement. 85 After Robert Olson died, the
defendants advised Mavis that she was obligated to pay off the
note.286
The supreme court determined that the defendants had com-
mitted legal malpractice by advising Mavis to pay off the note of
her deceased husband.287 The court held that a security interest
encumbering the interest of just one joint tenant is extinguished
and unenforceable at the death of the joint tenant/debtor.8 8 The
court determined that ownership in a surviving joint tenancy vests
at the time of the other's death.289 Therefore, the court reasoned
that since Robert's interest in the car cQnsisted of only a lifetime
interest, that interest was extinguished at Robert's death.29 ° Con-
sequently, the bank's security interest in Robert's interest in i'he
car was also extinguished. 29' Thus, the court affirmed the judg-
ment insofar as it awarded Mavis compensation for the defend-
ants' malpractice.292
281. Olson v. Fraase 421 N.W.2d 820, 830-31 (N.D. 1988).
282. Id. at 825. Leonell Fraase had been a business partner with Mavis' husband
Robert. Id. at 823. Paul Fraase became the personal representative of Robert's estate at his
death. Id. at 824. Leonell and Paul were also partners in the Fraase Law Firm. Id. at 822.
Mavis was thus eventually advised that the Fraase Law Firm would have a conflict of
interest in handling Robert's estate. Id. at 825.
283. Id. at 825, 830.
284. Id. at 830.
285. Id.
286. ld. at 824.
287. ld. at 832.
288. Id. at 831. Accord Commercial Banking Co. v. Spurlock, 231 S.E.2d 748, 749
(1977); Ogilvie v. Idaho Bank & Trust, 582 P.2d 215, 221 (1978); Home Trust Mercantile
Bank v. Staggs, 714 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Sherman County Bank v.
Lonowski, 289 N.W.2d 189, 191 (1980); Franke v. Third Nat'l Bank & Trust, 509 N.E.2d
955, 958-59 (1986).
289. 421 N.W.2d at 831.
290. Id. at 831 (citing Franke, 509 N.E.2d at 958). Justice Meschke dissented from this
part of the majority opinion. 421 N.w.2d at 833 (Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Meschke stated that it made no sense to void a voluntary agreement. Id. He noted
that a security interest on a joint tenant's interest in real property has not been voided in
North Dakota on similar grounds. Id.; see Renz v. Renz, 256 N.W.2d 883, 883-84 (N.D.
1977).
291. 421 N.W.2d at 831.
292. Id. at 833.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
JURIES
STATE V. HEGG
In State v. Hegg 293 the issue was whether it is constitutional to
have a jury of six for a felony trial. 294 Hegg was convicted of a
felony by a six-person jury. 95 Prior to trial, the district court
informed counsel that Hegg had failed to make a written demand
for a twelve-person jury pursuant to section 29-17-12 of the North
Dakota Century Code.296 The trial proceeded with a six-person.
jury without an objection from Hegg.297 After trial, Hegg moved
for a new trial, asserting that he was denied his state constitutional
right to a jury of twelve persons.2 98 Hegg alleged that section 29-
17-12 of the North Dakota Century Code conflicted with article 1,
section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution.29 9
The supreme court recognized that a statute is presumed con-
stitutional unless it contravenes the state or federal constitu
tion.30 0 In examining article I, section 13 of the North Dakota
Constitution, the court determined that the constitution uncondi-.
tionally required a twelve-person jury in felony trials.30 1 The
court also noted that the language of article 1, section 13 of the
North Dakota Constitution did not provide for legislative interfer-
ence with the size of a jury for felony trials.30 2 Therefore, the
court held that section 29-17-12 of the North Dakota Century
Code was unconstitutional as to the availability of a six-person jury
in a felony case.30 3 Thus, the court reversed the conviction and
293. 410 N.W.2d 152 (N.D. 1987).
294. State v. Hegg, 410 N.W.2d 152, 153 (N.D. 1987).
295. Id. I
296. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-12 (Supp. 1987). Section 29-17-12 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides in pertinent part: "In all felony and class A misdeameanor
cases when a jury is impaneled, a jury shall consist of six qualified jurors unless the
defendant makes a timely written demand for a jury of twelve." Id.
297. 410 N.W.2d at 153. The State argued that Hegg's silence was a waiver of the right
to a jury of twelve. Id. at 154. The court, however, stated that a waiver of a constitutional
right to a jury of twelve must be express and affirmative. Id. at 155.
298. Id. at 153.
299. Id. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-17-12 (Supp. 1987) with N.D. CONST. art. 1,
§ 13. For the relevant text of section 29-17-12 of the North Dakota Century Code, see
supra note 4. Article 1, section 13 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate. A
person accused of a crime for which he may be confined for a period of more
than one year has the right of trial by a jury of twelve. The legislative assembly
may determine the size of the jury for all other cases, provided that the jury
consists of at least six members. All verdicts must be unanimous.
300. 410 N.W.2d at 154.
301. N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13. Id. at 153; see N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
302. Id. at 154; see N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
303. 410 N.W.2d at 154.
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remanded the case for a new trial.3 °4
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
STATE V. RICEHILL
In State v. Ricehill 30 5 the issue was whether the defendant,
Elliot Ricehill, was denied effective assistance of counsel.
3 0 6
Ricehill was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon when the car Ricehill was riding in was stopped by the police
for an unrelated reason.30 7 Ricehill's trial attorney requested a
subpoena for a crucial witness the day before the trial was to
begin.30 8 The county sheriff was unable to serve the subpoena that
quickly and as a result, the witness was not present at the trial.30 9
The district court convicted Ricehill for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. 31 0 Ricehill claimed on appeal that his attorney's
request to subpoena a witness the day before the trial was unrea-
sonable and as such he was denied effective assistance of
counsel.3 '
The supreme court recognized that an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim may be raised on appeal although the district court
did not have an opportunity to decide the issue.31 2 However, the
court refused to begin an analysis of Ricehill's ineffective assistance
of counsel claim because the record did not indicate what the
absent witness's testimony would have been.31 3 The court stated
that it needed more than representations of the content of the wit-
ness's testimony in order to begin an analysis of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel.314  Thus, the supreme court affirmed the
conviction without prejudice noting that Ricehill may raise his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at a proceeding for post-con-
viction relief.315
304. Id. at 155.
305. 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987).
306. State v. Ricehill, 415 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1987).
307. Id. at 482.
308. Id. Ricehill alleges that the testimony of that witness at trial would have bolstered
Ricehill's testimony. Id. at 484.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 481.
311. Id. at 484.
312. Id. The court noted that the only indication of the content of the absent witness'
testimony was Ricehill's counsel's representations. Id.
313. Id. The court stated that it would accept an affidavit by the proposed witnesses.
Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 486.
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MENTAL HEALTH LAW
IN RE J.B.
In In reJ.B. 3 1 the issue was whether the trial court's denial of
J.B.'s request for substitution of appointed counsel was a violation
of J.B.'s right to due process under the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution. 317  J.B., who was mentally ill,
requested a newly appointed attorney at his treatment hearing.31 8
The court denied J.B.'s request, concluding that there was no basis
for substitution for counsel other than what appeared to be J.B.'s
severe mental disorder. 19
The supreme court held that individuals subject to North
Dakota's civil commitment proceedings are entitled to representa-
tion by counsel.32 ' The court, however, concluded that the federal
constitution does not provide for counsel of choice in a civil com-
mitment proceeding.32 ' The court determined that the matter of
substitution of counsel was within the discretion of the trial
court.32 2 The supreme court concluded that the trial court had
examined all of J.B.'s rights and interests. 323 In addition, the trial
court had determined that the conflict between J.B. and his attor-
ney was likely to occur with a new attorney.324 Therefore, the
court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying J.B. a substitute counsel.32
IN RE R.Z.
In In re R.Z.3 26 the issue was whether the record disclosed
that the respondent, R.Z., validly waived his due process right to
counsel.327 Pursuant to a petition for involuntary commitment
and a request for emergency treatment, R.Z. was appointed coun-
sel and ordered to the state hospital.2 8 At the treatment hearing
316. 410 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1987).
317. In re J.B., 410 N.W.2d 530, 532 (N.D. 1987); see U.S. CONST. amend. 14 § 1 (no
state shall deprive a person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law).
318. 410 N.W.2d at 531.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 532. The court stated that it had not previously decided that individuals
subject to civil commitment proceedings are entitled to counsel. Id.; see In re Ebertz, 333
N.W.2d 786, 788 (N.D. 1983).
321. 410 N.W.2d at 532; see U.S. CONST. amend. 14 § 1 (no deprivation of liberty
without due process of law).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 533.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. 415 N.W.2d 486 (N.D. 1987).
327. In re R.Z., 415 N.W.2d 486, 488 (N.D. 1987).
328. Id. at 487.
580 [Vol. 65:551
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
R.Z. appeared pro se.329 R.Z.'s court appointed counsel was pres-
ent but did not participate.33 ° When the court asked about legal
representation, R.Z. replied that he wished to represent himself
and that he did not need the advice of his attorney.331 The trial
court concluded that R.Z. was severely mentally ill and in need of
hospitalization.3 ,2
The supreme court noted that the due process right to counsel
in an involuntary commitment proceeding may be waived provid-
ing the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.33 3 The court
concluded that the record failed to affirmatively demonstrate that
R.Z. was competent to make an intelligent waiver of his right and
assert self-representation.334 The court stated that the record
should contain warnings and explanations to the individual con-
cerning the benefits associated with the right to counsel which an
individual relinquishes when he waives his right to representa-
tion. Also, the trial court must make sufficient inquiries on the
record as to the individual's competence to waive counsel.336
Thus, the court reversed and remanded the case for a rehearing
with representation provided by counsel.337
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES
FEDERAL LAND BANK V. GEFROH
In Federal Land Bank v. Gefroh 338 the issue was whether the
North Dakota Constitution forbids both the mortgaging and the
forced sale of one's homestead.339 Gordon Gefroh mortgaged land
which included his homestead, to the Federal Land Bank.340
Gefroh defaulted and the Bank subsequently foreclosed on the
land.341 Although the Bank evicted Gefroh from the land, he and
his family continued to occupy the homestead portion.342 Gefroh





333. Id. at 488 (citing In re D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D. 1978)).
334. Id. at 488.
335. Id.; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) ("when an accused manages
his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits
associated with the right to counsel").
336. 415 N.W.2d at 488.
337. Id. at 489.
338. 418 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1988).
339. Federal Land Bank v. Gefroh, 418 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1988).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 603.
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limits the circumstances under which a homestead can be mort-
gaged and subjected to a foreclosure sale.343 Upon the Bank's
motion, the trial court enjoined Gefroh's continued use of the
homestead.344
The supreme court upheld the trial court's injunction.345 The
court noted that section 47-18-04 of the North Dakota Century
Code specifically provides for the forced sale of homestead prop-
erty for debts that are secured by mortgages.3 46 The court deter-
mined that the early North Dakota legislature must have thought
that section 47-18-04 of the North Dakota Century Code was con-
stitutional because the legislature had passed the initial version of
the statute just two years after the adoption of the Constitution.3 47
Finally, the court noted that most people would not be able to
finance a home if they were unable to mortgage their home-
stead.34s Thus, the supreme court concluded that the injunction
issued by the lower court was constitutional.349
NEW TRIAL
CITY OF RIVERSIDE V. HELENSKE
In City of Riverside v. Helenske3 5 0 the issue was whether a
municipal court conviction based upon a valid plea of guilty
entered before a lawyer-judge can be appealed to county court for
a new trial.35 ' Thomas Helenske pleaded guilty before the City of
Riverside municipal court to the charge of driving while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol in violation of a city ordinance.35 2
The municipal judge imposed a fine and a suspended sentence.35 3
After hiring an attorney Helenske appealed his conviction to the
343. Id.; see N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 22.
Article XI, § 22 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts and necessaries of life shall be
recognized by wholesome laws, exempting from forced sale to all heads of
families of a homestead, the value of which shall be limited and defined by law;
and a reasonable amount of personal property; the kind and value shall be fixed
by law, This section shall not be construed to prevent liens against the
homestead for labor done and materials furnished in the improvement thereof,
in such manner as may be prescribed by law.
344. 410 N.W.2d at 603.
345. Id. at 605.
346. Id. at 604; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-04 (1978) (conditions when a homestead
is subject to an execution).
347. 418 N.W.2d at 604; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-04 (1978Xconditions when a
homestead is subject to an execution).
348. 418 N.W.2d at 605.
349. Id.
350. 413 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1987).
351. City of Riverside v. Helenske, 413 N.W.2d 363, 364 (N.D. 1987).
352. Id. Helenske appeared before the municipal court without counsel. Id.
353. Id.
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county court.35 4 Upon motion by the City of Riverside, the county
court dismissed Helenske's appeal, determining that Helenske had
waived his right to an appeal when he pleaded guilty in municipal
court.35  Helenske appealed from the county court's dismissal of
his appeal for a new trial.356
The supreme court held that when a defendant voluntarily
pleads guilty before a lawyer-judge who has fully informed him of
his rights and the consequences of his plea, then the defendant has
waived his right to an appeal for a new trial.35 7 The court recog-
nized the general rule that when a guilty plea is voluntarily
entered, constitutional rights as well as nonjurisdictional defects
are waived.358  The court noted that before the municipal judge
accepted Helenske's plea of guilty, the lawyer-judge asked Helen-
ske if he understood that he would be waiving or giving up his
rights to both a trial in the municipal court and an appeal if he
entered his guilty plea. 35 9 The court distinguished this case from
State v. Orr 36 0 in which there was no indication that Orr had been
advised of his rights before he pleaded guilty.36 1 Therefore, the
court affirmed the county court's dismissal of Helenske's appeal for




357. Id. at 365. The supreme court refused to decide the issue of whether section 40-
18-19 of the North Dakota Century Code provided for appeals from all judgments of
conviction regardless of whether they were based upon a plea of guilty. Id. at 364; see N.D.
CENT. CODE § 40-18-19 (1983 & Supp. 1987). In addition, the court refused to decide
whether a plea of guilty entered before a non-lawyer judge can be appealed to a county
court. Id.
358. Id. at 365 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); State v. Slapnicka,
376 N.W.2d 33, 35 (N.D. 1985)). In a dissenting opinion Justice Levine asserted that since a
municipal court was not a court of record, the general rule that a voluntary plea of guilty
waives non-jurisdictional defects and constitutional rights is not applicable to the instant
case. 413 N.W.2d at 365-66 (Levine, J., dissenting). Justice Levine noted that section 40-18-
19 of the North Dakota Century Code clearly "authorizes an appeal from a 'judgment of
conviction' in a municipal court." Id. at 366; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-19 (1983 &
Supp. 1987). Justice Levine reasoned that an accepted plea of guilty constitutes a
conviction for which judgment must be entered and a sentence imposed. 413 N.W.2d at
366. Therefore, Justice Levine determined that when Helenske entered his guilty plea and
the municipal court accepted such plea imposing a fine and a suspended sentence, the court
essentially entered a judgment of conviction which is appealable. ld.
359. 413 N.W.2d at 364-65. The record contained an affidavit of the municipal lawyer
judge stating that Helenske understood the consequences of a plea of guilty. Id. at 364.
360. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
361. 413 N.W.2d at 365 (citing State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 174 (N.D. 1985)).
362. 413 N.W.2d at 364.
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PARTNERSHIPS
ECKERT v. ECKERT
In Eckert v. Eckert 363 the issue was whether North Dakota
Century Code § 45-05-07 creates a presumption that property
acquired with partnership funds is partnership property.3 6 4 Ben
Eckert and Donovan Eckert were partners in a farming and
ranching business prior to the death of Donovan Eckert in 1982.365
The property in dispute in this action is a number of cooperative
patronage credits which were acquired during the partnership.
366
The credits were titled in Ben Eckert's name and he asserted that
they were his personal property.3 67 Gaila Eckert, personal repre-
sentative of the estate of Donovan Eckert, sought to prove that the
credits were partnership property.368 The trial court dismissed
Gaila Eckert's action, concluding that she had failed to meet her
burden of proof.
36 9
The supreme court held that North Dakota Century Code
§ 45-05-07 creates a presumption that property acquired with
partnership money is partnership property.3 7 0 Application of this
presumption would shift to Ben Eckert the burden of proving that
the credits were not partnership property.37 I Thus, the supreme
court reversed the district court and remanded the matter for a
new trial.372
RELEASE
ZIMPRJCH V. NORTH DAKOTA HARVESTORE SYSTEMS
In Zimprich v. North Dakota Harvestore Systems, 37 3 the issue
was whether Zimprich's release of the defendant Harvestore con-
stituted a release of defendant Agristor.374 In 1980 Zimprich
purchased a feed storage system from Harvestore.37 5 Zimprich
363. 425 N.W.2d 914 (N.D. 1988).






370. Id. at 916. In construing § 45-05-07, the court looked to the construction of
equivalent statutes in other jurisdictions, according to the provision in N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 1-02-13 that a statute which is part of a uniform law should be construed so as to effectuate
the purpose of making uniform the law of those states which enact it. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. 419 N.W.2d 912 (N.D. 1988).
374. Zimprich v. North Dakota Harvestore Sys., 419 N.W.2d 912, 913 (N.D. 1988).
375. Id. at 912.
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and Harvestore executed an installment contract.37 6 Harvestore
subsequently assigned its interest in the installment contract to
Agristor 7
In 1984 Agristor requested that Harvestore representatives
repossess the feed storage system because Agristor believed that
Zimprich was in default on the installment contract.37 8  Repre-
sentatives of Harvestore repossessed the storage system.379 Zim-
prich sued both Harvestore and Agristor for trespass and
conversion. 38 0 Before trial Zimprich and Harvestore agreed to a
settlement.38 1  Agristor subsequently asked the district court to
dismiss Zimprich's claims asserting that the claims were based on
the theory of vicarious liability and, as a matter of law, the release
of a servant from his wrongful conduct releases the master.382
The supreme court held that Zimprich's release of Harvestore
did not release Agristor from any liability for its own wrongful con-
duct.383 The court distinguished a previous case stating that "a
master is not released from claims of direct liability against the
master even though the servant has been released from liability in
the case. '38 4 The court determined that Agristor can be held
directly liable for ordering Harvestore to repossess the feed system
which was a wrongful act.385 Thus the court reversed the dismissal
and remanded for a trial on the merits.3 8
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
AMERICAN STATE BANK V. HEWSON
In American State Bank v. Hewson 38 7 the issue was whether
the secured party has the burden of showing the commercial rea-
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 913. While using the system, Zimprich became dissatisfied with it. Id. at
912. Zimprich eventually filed an action against Harvestore and the manufacturer claiming
negligence and breach of warranty. Id. at 912-13.
379. Id. at 913.
380. Id. Zimprich had previously brought an action against Harvestore alleging
negligence and breach of warranty. Id. After the repossession, Zimprich amended his
complaint to include Agristor as a defendant. Id.
381. Id. Zimprich settled all of his claims against Harvestor. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.; see Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316, 320 (1984) (release of a servant
constitutes a release of the masters from any claim based on respondent superior).
385. 419 N.W.2d at 914; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(a) comment a
(1977). Comment to section 877(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[olne
who orders an act to be done is liable for its consequences as he would be for his own
personal conduct." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877(a) comment a (1977).
386. 419 N.W.2d at 914.
387. 411 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1987).
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sonableness of the disposition of collateral where the secured party
seeks a deficiency judgment."' 8 Dale Hewson executed a promis-
sory note to the American State Bank providing as security two
fourteen-foot drills and a 1976 "Steiger Bearcat Tractor" with
dozer.38 9 After Hewson defaulted, the bank took possession of the
tractor and sold it at a public auction.390 After the sale the bank
commenced suit to recover the deficiency remaining after credit-
ing Hewson's account with the proceeds of the sale.39 ' Hewson
denied owing the amount of the deficiency asserting that the sale
of the tractor was not conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner. 39 2  The trial court granted the bank's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
3 93
The supreme court held that the secured party has the burden
of proof to show the commercial reasonableness of the disposition
of collateral.394 The court acknowledged that there is a split of
authority as to who has the burden of proof.395 The court stated
that a secured party has no presumption of commercial reasona-
bleness pursuant to section 41-09-53(2) of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code from the mere sale through public auction.3 96 The
court stated that the secured party must affirmatively establish
that the resale price was the fair and reasonable value of the collat-
eral. 97 The court concluded that the district court erred in grant-
ing the bank's motion for summary judgment because the issue of
388. American State Bank v. Hewson, 411 N.W.2d 57, 60-61 (N.D. 1987).
389. Id. at 58-59.
390. Id. at 59.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 60.
394. Id. at 61 (citing Fedders Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961, 972 (D. Minn. 1979).
395. Id. at 60.
396. Id. at 62; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-53(2X1983). Section 41-09-53(2) of the
North Dakota Century Code provides:
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a different
time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of
itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially
reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual
manner in any recognized market therefor or if he sells at the price current in
such market at the time of his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with
reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property sold he
has sold in a commercially reasonable manner. The principle stated in the two
preceding sentences with respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to
other types of disposition. A disposition which has been approved in any judicial
proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or representative of
creditors shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable, but this
sentence does not indicate that any such approval must be obtained in any case
nor does it indicate that any disposition not so approved is not commercially
reasonable.
They recognized a restrictive definition of the term "recognized market." 411 N.W.2d
at 62. The court stated that a public auction is not a recognized market. Id.
397. 411 N.W.2d at 63.
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whether or not the tractor was sold in a commercially reasonable
manner was an issue of fact."' 8 Thus, the supreme court reversed
the district court's granting of summary judgment and remanded




The issue in State v. Gahner4 ° ° was whether the state must
provide the accused with notice of the state's proposed use of his
prior convictions to increase the charge and enhance his sen-
tence.4 °1 Steven Gahner (Gahner) was charged by a uniform traf-
fic complaint with driving while under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage and or with a blood alcohol content above .10
percent.40 2 The prosecuting attorney presented records of two
other D.U.I. convictions of Gahner within five years and urged
that Gahner be sentenced for a class A misdemeanor and as a
third-time offender.40 3 Although Gahner objected by indicating
that the prior convictions were not mentioned in the complaint,
the trial court, nevertheless, sentenced him for a class A misde-
meanor as a third-time offender.40 4
Although there is no constitutional requirement that prior
offenses be placed in an indictment or information before trial,
fairness suggests that defendant be notified so that he can meet
the allegation of prior convictions. 40 5 An indictment or informa-
tion must name the defendant and contain a plain, concise, and
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.40 6 The supreme court concluded that a complainant,
under North Dakota Century Code Section 39-08-01, must either
398. Id. at 65.
399. Id.
400. 413 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1987).
401. State v. Gahner, 413 N.W.2d 359, 360 (N.D. 1987).
402. Id. at 360; N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 provides in pertinent part:
1. A person may not drive any vehicle upon a highway...if any of the following
apply:
b. that person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
3. A person violating this section or equivalent ordinance is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor for the first and second conviction in a five-year period, and of a
class A misdemeanor for a later conviction in a five-year period.
Id.
403. 413 N.W.2d at 360.
404. Id. Cahner was fined $1,000 and sentenced to imprisonment for one year, with
all but sixty days suspended upon conditions. Id.
405. Id. at 361; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
406. N.D.R. Crim. P. 7(c); 413 N.W.2d 359, 361 (N.D. 1987).
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charge the class A misdemeanor, allege the prior offense-enhanc-
hmg convictions, or both.40 7 Therefore, the supreme court vacated
Gahner's sentence and remanded the trial court to sentence him
for a class B misdemeanor and first offense.408
TITLE TO LAND
BREND V. DOME DEVELOPMENT, LTD.
In Brend v. Dome Development 40 9 the issue was whether a
dissolved corporation could issue a valid warranty deed.410 In June
1975 the Brends purchased land on a contract for deed from
Dome Development.4" The Brends did not record the contract
for deed until July 1986."12 During the interim, the Wikenheisers
became president and secretary of Dome Development.41 3 In
February 1980 a certificate of dissolution was issued for Dome
Development. 414 However, in October 1985 the Wilkenheisers
executed a warrant deed conveying the same land to the Vol-
lers. 41 5 The Brends commenced this quiet-title action alleging
that the Vollers' warranty deed was void because Dome Develop-
ment was dissolved when the deed was conveyed.416
The supreme court held that the warranty deed received by
the Vollers was void as a matter of law and that the Vollers did not
acquire any interest in the land by virtue of that deed.4 7 The
court concluded that a conveyance by a dissolved corporation is
void in the absence of a contrary statute.4 8 The court noted that
the Vollers did not establish that Dome Development's convey-
ance to them was necessary for winding up the corporation.4 19
407. 413 N.W.2d at 362.
408. Id. at 363.
409. 418 N.W.2d 610 (N.D. 1988).




414. Id. Wayne Wikenheiser had submitted articles of dissolution stating that all
remaining property of the corporation had been distributed. Id. However, since the
Brends had not yet recorded their deed, Dome Development remained the record owner
of the land. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 613. Since the Vollers did not acquire any interest in the land, the Vollers
could not raise laches as defined. Id.
418. Id. at 611; see New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Virgil & Frank's Locker Serv., 302
F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 1962) (purported acts of a nonentity are without legal effect).
419. Id. at 612. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-109(3X1985Xoriginal version at N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 10-21-05 and -06 (1983)). Section 10-19.1-109(3) of the North Dakota
Century Code provides: "All tangible or intangible property, including money, remaining
after the discharge of the debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation must be
distributed to the shareholders in accordance with subsection 4 of section 10-19.1-92." Id.
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Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's judgment
quieting title in the Brends' favor.42 °
JP. FURLONG ENTERPRISES V. SUN EXPLORATION &
PRODUCTION CO.
In JP. Furlong Enterprises v. Sun Exploration & Production
Co.42 1 the issue was who owned the oil and gas rights underlying
an oxbow which was formed after a man-made change in the
course of the Missouri River.422 In 1957 the United States
acquired land by eminent domain in section 15, township 152
North, Range 103 West, McKenzie County, from Emery Papi-
neau. 423 Papineau retained "all oil and gas rights" pursuant to a
stipulation embodied in the condemnation decree.424 Thereafter,
the United States Corps of Engineers dug a large trench through
section 15, causing the navigable Missouri River to form a new
channel through the trench.42 5 Consequently, a long oxbow of for-
mer riverbed remained (a portion of which is located in the NE-
1/4, section 9 of the same township).
426
In August 1983 Ladd Petroleum Corp. obtained an oil and gas
lease from the State of North Dakota covering the mineral inter-
ests in the oxbow riverbed located in section 9.427 The lands
adjoining the oxbow in section 9 had previously been leased by
Sun Exploration & Production Co. (hereinafter Sun) in 1982.428 In
September 1983 J.P. Furlong Enterprises (hereinafter Furlong)
acquired an oil and gas lease from Papineau's successor in interest
also covering the oxbow riverbed in section 9.429 Sun subse-
quently caused a producing oil and gas well to be drilled and com-
pleted in the NE-1/4 of section 9.430
Following completion of the well, Furlong instituted an action
against Sun and several other mineral and royalty owners to quiet
title to the oxbow riverbed in section 9.431 Furlong contended
that the State did not own the oil and gas beneath the oxbow;
420. 418 N.W.2d at 613-14.
421. 423 N.W.2d 130 (N.D. 1988).








429. Id. The lease was taken by Marc A. Chorney, who subsequently assigned his
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rather the State owned the oil and gas beneath the new channel in
section 15.432 Furlong's claim was based on section 47-06-07 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which provides: "If a stream, navi-
gable or not navigable, forms a new course abandoning its ancient
bed, the owners of the land newly occupied take by way of indem-
nity the ancient bed abandoned, each in proportion to the land of
which he has been deprived. ' 433 Sun took the position that sec-
tion 47-06-07 of the North Dakota Century Code did not apply to
artificial changes in the course of a navigable river, and that the
statute did not apply to the oxbow riverbed which still contained
water.434 The trial court declined to apply the statute and dis-
missed Furlong's complaint, granting summary judgment to
Sun.
4 35
The supreme court held that the statute did apply to the man-
made shift in the Missouri River.436 The court recognized that at
common law an avulsive 437 change resulting from natural or artifi-
cial causes did not result in any change of title. 431 Section 47-06-07
of the North Dakota Century Code modifies the common law,
however, by providing that a particular kind of avulsion results in
a change of title when a stream "forms a new course abandoning
its ancient bed. 439 The court traced the origin of the statute back
through the Field Code to the Code Napoleon and the Digest of
Justinian (Roman Law) and the court found that the statutory his-
tory supported the break from the common law.440 The court also
noted that this departure from the common law is consistent with
the policy of the United States in protecting the public right of
navigation. 441 Thus, the supreme court held that the statute was
applicable even though the course of the Missouri River had
changed due to artificial means and the old riverbed still con-
tained water.442 The trial court's summary judgment was there-
fore reversed.4 43
432. Id. Therefore, the state's lease to Ladd Petroleum of the oil and gas rights under
the oxbow riverbed would be invalid. Id.
433. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-07 (1978).
434. J.P. Furlong Enter. v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d at 131.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 140; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-07 (1978).
437. 423 N.W.2d at 133 n.4 "'Avulsion' refers to the sudden inundation or sweeping
away of land resulting from a sudden change in the course of a waterbody." Id. at 133 n,4
(citing Beck, The Wandering Missouri River A Study in Accretion Law, 43 N.D.L. REV. 429,
431 (1967)).
438. 423 N.W.2d at 134.
439. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-07 (1978)).
440. Id. at 135-36.
441. Id. at 136. A federal navigational servitude applies to any navigable stream. ld.
442. ld. at 140.
443. Id. Several other issues were not reached by the court. Id. These issues included:
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IN RE OWNERSHIP OF THE BED OF DEVILS LAKE
In In re Ownership of the Bed of Devils Lake444 the issue was
whether the meander line44 was the ordinary high water mark
(hereinafter OHMK) of Devils Lake at statehood and currently
remained so because the doctrine of reliction 446 was inapplicable
to Devils Lake.4 7 The State contended that it took title to the bed
of Devils Lake at statehood to the OHMK as represented by the
meander line established by governmental surveys. 448 Therefore
the state maintained that it retained title to all lands up to the
meander line which includes land now bared by recession of the
waters of Devils Lake.449 The private landowners adjacent to the
meander line contended that they owned the land exposed by the
recession of the waters of Devils Lake pursuant to the doctrine of
reliction, which would give them title to the current OHMK.45 °
The trial court held that the boundary of Devils Lake was deline-
ated by the OHMK and not the surveyed meander lines.45 1
Therefore the private landowners had title to the bed below the
OHMK down to the lower water mark pursuant to the doctrine of
reliction and section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code.452
The supreme court, in affirming the district court's holding,
noted that a water line, rather than a meander line, ordinarily
forms the boundary of a tract of land abutting a navigable body of
water.45 3 Moreover, the court determined that the fact that the
OHMK was ambulatory in nature did not preclude application of
(1) whether or not the oxbow riverbed has been abandoned, or rather, twins, the existing
Missouri River; (2) whether the United States is a necessary party; and (3) whether the
defenses of laches or limitations should apply. Id. The court stated that unless the
defendants can prevail on one of these issues on remand, Furlong will have title to the oil
and gas rights underlying the former riverbed. Id.
444. 423 N.W.2d 141 (N.D. 1988).
445. See Black's Law Dictionary 884 (5th ed. 1979). A meander line is a line run in
surveying particular portions of the public lands which border on navigable rivers and
lakes, not as boundaries of the tract, but for the purpose of defining the sinuosites of the
banks of the stream, and as the means of ascertaining the quantity of land within the
fractional subdivision. Id.
446. Beck, Boundary Litigation and Legislation in North Dakota, 41 N.D.L. REV. 424
(1965). Reliction is the process by which land is bared by the gradual recession of water. Id.
at 445.
447. In re Ownership of the Bed of Devils Lake, 423 N.W.2d 141, 142-43 (N.D. 1988).
448. Id. at 142.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 142-43.
451. Id. at 142.
452. ld. at 142; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978). Section 47-01-15 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides in pertinent part, "Except when the grant under which the
land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on a
navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low water mark." Id.
453. 423 N.W.2d at 143.
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the doctrine of reliction to Devils Lake.a54 The court further con-
cluded that sufficient evidence had been introduced to establish an
OHMK demarcation line serving as the lake boundary and thus
warranted application of the doctrine of reliction a55 Conse-
quently, the supreme court determined that the district court had
correctly found that the littoral private landowners were granted
title to the lake bed below the OHMK down to the low water mark
pursuant to section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code.456
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CANTERRA PETROLEUM V. WESTERN DRILLING & MINING
SUPPL Y
In Canterra Petroleum v. Western Drilling & Mining Sup-
ply 457 the main issue the court addressed was if the determination
was a question of fact as to whether a party to a transaction is a
merchant under the Uniform Commercial Code.458 This multi-
party litigation arose from many commercial paper transactions
concerning oilfield pipe which was stored at Port Pipe's facility
until the final purchaser moved it.459 The pipe was owned by
Mitchell Energy Corporation (Mitchell) who entrusted the pipe to
Port Pipe for storage. 46" Two employees of Port Pipe fraudulently
transferred the pipe to a dummy corporation, Pharoah Inc.46 '
Pharoah then sold the pipe to Nickel Supply Company, Inc., who
then sold it to Yamin Oil Supply. 462 Yamin then sold the pipe to
Northstar who in turn sold the pipe to Western Drilling & Mining
Supply (Western).46 3  Finally, Western sold the pipe to
Canterra.464 Canterra was later forced to relinquish the pipe to
Mitchell, the original owner.465 Canterra received summary judg-
454. Id. at 144.
455. Id. at 145.
456. Id. at 142, 145; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978). In dissent, Surrogate
Justice Pederson presented the view that a constantly moving property line could lead to
absurd results by providing no reasonable real property boundary for title purposes. Id. at
146 (Pederson, Surr. J., dissenting).
457. 418 N.W.2d 267 (N.D. 1987).
458. Canterra Petroleum v. Western Drilling & Mining, 418 N.W.2d 267, 270 (N.D.
1987).









ment on its breach of warranty of title claim against Western.466
Western then moved for and was granted summary judgment on
its third-party claim against Northstar. 6 7 Northstar appealed the
lower court's grant of summary judgment.16  The trial court held
as a matter of law that Port Pipe was not a merchant, and thus
could not transfer good title to the pipe.46 9 Northstar's main con-
tention on appeal was that these were material issues of fact
remaining to be resolved as to the applicability of the Uniform
Commercial Code's entrustment provision.a 0
The supreme court held that the determination of whether
Port Pipe was a merchant under the Uniform Commercial Code
was a question of fact 471 and that the trial court erred in holding as
a matter of law that Port Pipe was not a "merchant. 472 The court
recognized that this case should be decided using the entrustment
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, codified at section 41-
02-48(2) of the North Dakota Century Code.47 3 Section 41-02-
48(2) of the North Dakota Century Code provides: "Any entrust-
ing of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business.4 a7 4 The court concluded
that the entrustment doctrine applied to situations in which the
employees of the entrustee fraudulently transfer entrusted goods
to a sham corporation which in turn sells the goods to a good faith
purchaser in the ordinary course of business.a75 Consequently, the
supreme court reversed the summary judgment granted by the
trial court and remanded the case for trial on its merits.4 76
STATE V. KRAFT
In State v. Kraft477 the issue was whether the trial court erred
in denying Kraft's motion for acquittal or a new trial based upon a
Uniform Commercial Code defense. 478 Garold Kraft was in the




469. Id. at 270.
470. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-48 (1983Xentrustment doctrine).
471. Id.; see Greater Southern Distrib. v. Usry 184 S.E.2d 486, 487 (1971); Bauer v.
Curan, 360 N.W.2d 88, 90 (Iowa 1984); Agrex, Inc. v. Schrant, 379 N.W.2d 751, 754 (1986).
472. 418 N.W.2d at 274.
473. Id. at 273-74.
474. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-48 (1983).
475. Canterra Petroleum v. Western Drilling & Mining Supply, 418 N.W.2d at 273.
476. Id. at 275.
477. 413 N.W.2d 303 (N.D. 1987).
478. State v. Kraft, 413 N.W.2d 303, 305 (N.D. 1987).
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pany.479 Kraft contracted with customers for the sale and con-
struction of metal buildings.480  The component parts of the
buildings which consisted of prefabricated metal sheets, bolts,
doors, etc., were interchangeable.481 In July 1984, Alvin Anderson
purchased a metal building from Kraft.482 The building was never
delivered by Kraft because Anderson could not accept delivery
since he did not have a foundation or other acceptable site pre-
pared for the structure.48 3
In June 1985 Duane Vetter contacted Kraft because Vetter
was looking for some replacement metal sheeting.484 Kraft sold to
Vetter thirty-six roofing sheets from the component parts of the
building which Kraft had previously sold to Anderson.48 5 In
March 1986 Kraft was arrested for theft of property and was subse-
quently convicted of a class C felony.486
At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, Kraft argued that
the jury had not been instructed about a defense to the crime
based upon the Uniform Commercial Code.487 Kraft's previous
counsel had not asked for an instruction on any U.C.C. defense.488
Kraft asserted defenses pursuant to the delivery and acceptarice
section of the U.C.C.
489
Kraft asserted that where no specific time of delivery was set,
then (Section 41-02-26(1)) North Dakota Century Code,49 ° would
entitle him to a reasonable time to deliver the building after deliv-
ery was requested.49 1 Also, Kraft asserted that delivery had been
tendered but Anderson had no facility reasonably suited for
receipt of the goods which is required pursuant to section 41-02-
479. Id.
480. Id.




485. Id. Anderson had never asked Kraft for delivery of the building. Id. Even after
Kraft sold the sheeting to Vetter, Kraft could have obtained the metal roofing sheeting by
the time Anderson's building was to be completed. Id.
486. Id. at 304-05. The police confronted Kraft about his transaction with Vetter and
Kraft admitted that he sold the sheeting to Vetter. Id. at 304. Kraft added, however, that
he could complete Anderson's building any time that Anderson requested it to be erected.
Id.
487. Id. at 305; N.D. CENT. CODE title 41 (1983 & Supp. 1987XUniform Commercial
Code).
488. 413 N.W.2d at 305.
489. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 4 1-01-15(5X1983Xcourse of dealing and usage of
trade); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-26(1X1983Xabsent specific time-reasonable); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 41-02-51(1X1983Xseller's tender of delivery).
490. 413 N.W.2d at 306; N.D. Cent. Code § 41-02-26(1) (1983) (absence of specific time
provisions-Notice of termination).
491. 413 N.W.2d at 306; N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-26(1X1983).
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51(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.4 9 2 Kraft further con-
tended that the trade non-unique component parts are treated as
inventory to be sold as needed and replaced.493
The supreme court held that the jury should have been
instructed as to the defenses pursuant to the U.C.C.49 4 The court
determined that any defense based on delivery or acceptance
relates to Kraft's intent and intent is an essential element of theft
of property.495 The court stated that the failure to instruct the
jury on these defenses was an error that infringes upon the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant. 49 6 Therefore the court concluded
that the failure to give appropriate defense instructions had a sig-
nificant impact on the verdict, thus, the court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.497
VENDORS AND PURCHASERS
HAGAN V. HAVNVIK
In Hagan v. Havnvik 498 the issue was whether the purchaser
of land under a contract for deed was liable for a deficiency judg-
ment because he signed a personal guaranty.499  Havnvik
purchased land from Hagan with the intent to build a gasoline sta-
tion on the premises.5 °0 In addition to the contract for deed,
Havnvik also signed a guaranty contract which made him person-
ally liable for the complete performance of the contract for
deed.50 ' Havnvik failed to pay an annual installment and the
Hagans sued under the default provision of the contract and also
claimed Havnvik was personally liable under the guaranty con-
tract which he had signed.50 2
The supreme court noted that anti-deficiency statutes provide
that when a vendor of a land contract forecloses on the contract,
the vendee will be liable for a deficiency judgment only under
492. 413 N.W.2d at 306; N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-51(1X1983).
493. 413 N.W.2d at 306-07; N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-05-15(5X1983).
494. 413 N.W.2d at 307.
495. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(1X1985Xmust have taken with intent to
deprive).
496. 413 N.W.2d at 307.
497. Id. at 308.
498. 421 N.W.2d 56 (N.D. 1988).
499. Hagan v. Havnvik, 421 N.W.2d 56, 58 (N.D. 1988).
500. Id. at 57. The purchase price was $84,285. Id. Havnvik put $16,857 down and
was to repay the remaining balance in annual installments. Id. The contract for deed had a
default provision which provided that the sellers could declare the entire debt immediately
due if the buyer breached any convenant under the contract. Id. at 58.
501. Id. at 58.
502. Id.
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very limited circumstances.5 °3 The supreme court further noted
that in order to obtain a deficiency judgment in North Dakota the
vendor must bring a separate action against the party personally
liable for that part of the debt.50 4 Havnvik was a party to the prin-
cipal obligation of the contract for deed and to the guaranty con-
tract.50 5 Therefore, the court concluded the guaranty by Havnvik
was not "a promise to answer for a debt ... of another person"506
because Havnvik was the principal debtor as well as the guaran-
tor.50 7 The supreme court thus reversed the lower court's judg-
ment which had required Havnvik to pay the deficiency judgment
because of the presence of the guaranty contract.
5 0 8
WEAPONS
FIRST TRUST CO. v. SCHEELS HARDWARE & SPORTS SHOP
In First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop 509 the
issue was whether Karlene Holen could recover for the loss of her
son's society and companionship.5 0 Steven Holen, age fourteen,
was accidentally shot by William Boyer, age fifteen. 51 1 As a result
of the shooting, Steven was severely and permanently disabled.512
The trial court struck Karlene's claim for loss of "the love, affec-
tion, society, services, comfort, guidance, companionship, and sup-
port" of Steven. 3
The supreme court held that Karlene could recover for loss of
society and companionship despite the fact that the court would
not be following the principles of stare decisis.5 14 The court
acknowledged that the common law did not allow recovery for the
loss of a child's society and companionship. 5  The court noted
that, when child labor was an important aspect of the economy,
recovery for pecuniary loss was considered the appropriate mea-
503. Id. at 61; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976Xanti-deficiency judgment
statute).
504. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-06 (1976) (anti-deficiency judgment statute).
505. 421 N.W.2d at 61.
506. Id. at 61 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-01-01(1) (1978) (definition of guaranty)).
507. Id. at 61.
508. Id. at 61; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 22-01-01(1X1978Xguaranty is a promise to
answer for the debt of another).
509. 429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D. 1988).
510. First Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, 429 N.W.2d 5, 9 (N.D. 1988).
First Trust Co. was the conservator of Karlene Holen son's estate. Id. at 7.
511. Id. at 7.
512. Id. at 7-8.
513. Id. at 9.




sure of recovery for the death or injury of a child.516 The court
further noted that today, however, the child's society and compan-
ionship are considered more valuable than his labor.517 The court
also recognized that compensation for noneconomic damages,
while not capable of exact mathematical calculation, may be
awarded in personal injury actions pursuant to section 32-03.2-04
of the North Dakota Century Code.518 Thus, the supreme court
reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.51 9
WORKER'S COMPENSATION
BARSNESS V. GENERAL DIESEL & EQUIPMENT CO.
In Barsness v. General Diesel & Equipment Co.520 the issue
was whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers com-
pensation act prevents a third-party tort-feasor from obtaining
indemnification from the employer.5 2' First Assembly of God
Church (First Assembly) leased a crane from General Diesel &
Equipment Co. (General Diesel).522 The lease agreement pro-
vided that First Assembly should indemnify General Diesel for lia-
bility arising out of the operation of the crane.523 Raymond
Barsness, an employee of First Assembly, was injured while work-
ing with the crane.524 Barsness commenced an action against
General Diesel alleging negligent entrustment of the crane to an
inexperienced operator and negligent failure to warn.525 The trial
court entered a judgment in favor of Barsness and against General
Diesel for $98,000.526 Barsness could not sue his employer First
Assembly because he was barred by the cohesive remedy provi-
sions of the workers compensation act.527 General Diesel then
sought indemnification from First Assembly pursuant to the terms
of the written lease.5 28 First Assembly contended that it was an
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-04(2 XSupp. 1987Xcompensation for
noneconomic damages allowed for wrongful death).
519. Id. at 14.
520. 422 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1988).
521. Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 422 N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1988).See
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01, 65-01-08, 65-04-28, and 65-05-06 (1985Xstatutes limiting
recovery against the employer in the workers compensation act).
522. Id. at 821.
523. Id. at 825.
524. Id. at 821.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 821; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1985Xcontributing employer relieved
from liability for injury to employee).
528. 422 N.W.2d at 822.
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immune employer under the exclusive remedy provisions of the
workers compensation act and therefore General Diesel could not
obtain indemnity from it.
5 29
The supreme court held that an express contract of indemnifi-
cation is an exception to the exclusive remedy rule.5 30 The court
recognized the general exclusive remedy rule which provides that
when an employer complies with the workers compensation stat-
utes, a third-party tort-feasor is prevented from obtaining contri-
bution from the employer.531 The court followed the majority of
jurisdictions which recognize that an express contract of indemni-
fication is an exception to the exclusive remedy rule.532 The court
adopted the reasoning that an express contract is an exception
because the action on the contract is a separate legal claim based
upon a contractual obligation rather than based on the common
law.533 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the judgment granting
indemnification.534
KREIN V. MARIAN MANOR NURSING HOME
In Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home535 the issue was
whether the trial court erred in dismissing Krein's claim against
Marian Manor for wrongful termination of employment.5 36 Krein
was employed as a nurse's aide by Marian Manor from 1979 to
1984.537 Krein was terminated from employment and thereafter
sued Marian Manor alleging: 1) Marian Manor discharged her in
retaliation because she intended to claim workers compensation;
and 2) Marian Manor violated § 14-02.4 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code by discharging her for being obese.5 3S The trial court
dismissed all Krein's allegations and this appeal ensued.3 9
529. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01, 65-01-08, 65-04-28, and 65-05-06
(1985Xstatutes limiting recovery against the employer in the workers compensation act).
530. Id. at 824.
531. Id. at 822 (citing Gernand v. Ost Servs., 298 N.W.2d 500, 503-04 (N.D. 1980)). See
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01, 65-01-08, 65-04-28, and 65-05-06 (1985Xstatutes limiting
recovery against the employer in the workers compensation act).
532. Id. at 823.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 827. Two percent of the negligence which caused the accident was
attributed to General Diesel. Id. at 825. The court determined that the lease did not
express a clear intention that First Assembly indemnify General Diesel for General Diesel's
negligence. Id. at 826. Therefore, the court reversed the portion of the judgment which
required indemnification for General Diesel's negligence. Id.
535. 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987).
536. Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 794 (N.D. 1987).
537. Id.
538. Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.4 (Supp. 1987XNorth Dakota's policy toward
discrimination).
539. 415 N.W.2d at 794. Krein also alleged that Marian Manor's termination of her
employment was a breach of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
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The supreme court of North Dakota determined that the
retaliatory discharge of an employee for seeking workers compen-
sation violates public policy in North Dakota. 4 ' The court noted
that Krein conceded that her employment with Marian Manor was
at will.54 ' The court determined that the benefit of workers com-
pensation benefits would be small if an employer could discharge
an employee who sought the compensation benefits. 542 Thus, the
court reversed the lower court's dismissal and held that Krein
could sue Marian Manor in tort for retaliatory discharge. 543 The
supreme court also determined that the trial court did not err in
dismissing Krein's claim for discrimination against a person with a
physical handicap. 44 The court noted that the legislature did not
define the term physical disability. 545 The supreme court agreed
with the lower court that obesity may lead to a condition which
results in a disability or handicap.546 However, the court stated
that Krein failed to show that her obesity was a physical handicap,
under chapter 14-01-4 of the North Dakota Century Code.541
Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the summary judgment in
favor of Marian Manor on the discrimination issue.548
KROEPLIN V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
BUREAU
In Kroeplin v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau 5 49 the issue was whether an employee is entitled to a per-
manent partial impairment award when the employee's injury is
not substantiated by objective medical evidence.550  Cora
Kroeplin injured her right knee when she fell on her employer's
parking lot.551 The North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau (Bureau) paid her medical expenses and awarded her disa-
bility benefits.5 52 Kroeplin's treating physician evaluated her as
540. Id. The court noted that the public policy of the state with regard to workers
compensation is set forth at section 65-01-01 of the workers compensation law.Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. 415 N.W.2d at 793-94.
544. Id. at 795.
545. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.4 (Supp. 1987XNorth Dakota's discrimination
statutes).
546. 415 N.W.2d at 795.
547. Id. at 796. The plaintiff testified that her obesity was not a handicap and offered
no expert evidence equating her obesity to a disability. Id.
548. Id.
549. 415 N.W.2d 807 (N.D. 1987).
550. Kroeplin v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 807, 809 (N.D.
1987).
551. Id. at 808.
552. Id.
1989] 599
600 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:551
having a twenty-five percent permanent impairment of the right
knee.553 The Bureau, however, denied Kroeplin's claim for a per-
manent partial impairment award because her impairment was
not substantiated by the American Medical Association's guide-
lines.5 5 4 The Bureau had previously adopted a directive which
stated that the AMA guidelines require an objective demonstra-
tion of impairment.5 5 5 The Bureau concluded that Kroeplin failed
to supply objective proof that she was physically impaired.55 '
The supreme court noted the Bureau's concession that pain
may cause permanent partial impairment. 5 7 In addition, the
court determined that the statutory definition of permanent
impairment is not limited to impairments demonstrated only by
objective findings. 5 8 The supreme court, therefore, concluded
that the Workmen's Compensation Act authorizes a permanent
partial impairment award to an injured worker despite the lack of
objective evidence demonstrating the impairment. 559 Thus, the




In Hopkins v. McBane56 ' the issues were whether the district
553. Id. at 808-09. The physician's evaluation took into account the amount of pain
Kroeplin experienced on a regular basis. Id. at 809.
554. Id. at 808; see AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION
OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT (2d ed. 1984).
555. 415 N.W.2d at 809. The Bureau is authorized to promulgate rules that are
consistent with the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act which are needed to carry
out the provisions of the act. Id. at 808 n.1; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08 (1985 & Supp.
1987) (Workmen's Compensation Act). However, the Bureau failed to adopt the directive
pursuant to North Dakota's Administrative Agencies Practices Act. 415 N.W.2d at 808 n.1;
see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-32 (1974 & Supp. 1987) (Administrative Agencies Practice Act).
Justice VandeWalle in his concurrence stated that he might have decided the case
differently had the Bureau followed the procedures for promulgation of administrative
rules in the Administrative Agencies Practices Act. 415 N.W.2d at 811 (VandeWalle, J.,
concurring); see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-32 (1974 & Supp. 1987) (Administrative Agencies
Practice Act).
556. 415 N.W.2d at 809.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 810; see N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05-12 to -14 (1985) (Workmen's
Compensation Act). The court noted that it had previously allowed disability payments on
the basis of subjective physical findings. 415 N.W.2d at 810; see Lyson v. North Dakota
Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 129 N.W.2d 351, 354 (1964Xdisabilities from neurosis which
were caused by a compensable injury are covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act).
559. 415 N.W.2d at 810. The supreme court took note that other states allow awards
for impairments due to pain although the pain was measured subjectively and was not
ratable under the AMA guides. Id.; see Smith v. Industrial Comm'n, 552 P.2d 1198, 1200-01
(1976).
560. 415 N.W.2d at 810.
561. 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1988).
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court erred in awarding damages for loss of society, comfort, and
companionship as well as mental anguish to the mother as a result
of the wrongful death of a viable fetus.5 62 Antoinette Hopkins
brought suit against R.D. McBane, M.D., and the hospital claiming
that they acted negligently by failing to act when she was admit-
ted to the hospital with a ruptured membrane.563 The trial court
found that McBane's and the hospital's negligence caused the
fetus' death.5 64 The court awarded damages of $50,000 for mental
anguish and grief and $100,000 for loss of companionship, society,
and comfort.5 65
The supreme court held that a parent may recover damages
for loss of society, comfort, and companionship in an action for the
wrongful death of a child. 66 The court noted that while its previ-
ous decisions have implicitly authorized such damages, it was
appropriate to clarify the matter.5 67 The court concluded that to
the extent that previous decisions held that a parent may not
recover damages in a wrongful death action for the loss of society
and companionship of a child, these decisions are overruled.5
6 8
The supreme court also held that a parent could recover dam-
ages for mental anguish resulting from the wrongful death of a
child.5 6 9 The court stated that it was illogical to allow damages for
mental anguish in a personal injury suit, but not in wrongful death
actions. 5 0 The court noted that its decision to allow recovery for
mental anguish in wrongful death cases was a minority position.571




566. Id. at 92.
567. Id.
568. Id. The court overruled parts of two cases. Id.; see Kalsow v. Grob, 237 N.W. 848
(1931); Stejskal v. Darrow, 215 N.W. 83 (1927).
569. 427 N.W.2d at 94; the court expressly overruled in part several cases. Id.; see
Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1965); Dahl v. North American Creameries, 61
N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1953); Hyyti v. Smith, 272 N.W. 747 (1937); Stejskal v. Darrow, 215 N.W.
83 (1927); Haug v. Great Northern Ry., 77 N.W. 97 (1898).
570. Id. at 93. The court noted that the difficulty of measuring mental anguish
damages was an argument used for not allowing the damages in wrongful death cases. Id.
However, the court noted that juries are capable of measuring mental anguish in personal
injury suits. Id.
571. Id. at 94.
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